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“What are you supposed to do when all your client can give you is,
‘He got in my face so I shot him’?”1
INTRODUCTION
Language has been called “the stuff of thought,”2 “an expres-
sion of innate human nature,”3 and “a fistula: an open wound
through which our innards are exposed to an infectious world.”4
At a more prosaic level, language and the ability to use it can
be called the quintessential tools of human development and
communication:
A child who acquires language and the ability to use it effectively
can carry on a conversation with a total stranger, make friends,
tell a story, laugh at a joke, follow rules, figure out what makes
other people tick, control his behavior, avoid offending conver-
sational partners, and look forward to a lifetime of learning.5
For all of the power of language, however, the process of ac-
quiring it in early childhood remains singularly vulnerable, and
any resulting language impairments can have serious lifelong so-
cial, behavioral, emotional, and communicative effects. Those ef-
fects can be regularly observed in the criminal and juvenile justice
systems.
Decades of research have shown that language impairments—
i.e., deficits in language and language usage6—occur at starkly ele-
vated rates among adolescents and adults charged with and con-
victed of crimes.7 British researchers estimate that “50–60% of
1 Attorney I, see infra notes 57–58.
2 STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT: LANGUAGE AS A WINDOW INTO HUMAN
NATURE 380 (2007).
3 GUY DEUTSCHER, THROUGH THE LANGUAGE GLASS: WHY THE WORLD LOOKS DIF-
FERENT IN OTHER LANGUAGES 6 (2010) (referring to Noam Chomsky’s theory of innate
universal grammar).
4 PINKER, supra note 2, at 425.
5 Michele LaVigne & Gregory Van Rybroek, Breakdown in the Language Zone: The
Prevalence of Language Impairments Among Juveniles and Why It Matters, 15 U.C. DAVIS J.
JUV. L. & POL’Y 37, 46–47 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1663805.
6 Carla J. Johnson, Joseph H. Beitchman & E.B. Brownlie, Twenty-Year Follow-Up of
Children With and Without Speech-Language Impairments: Family, Educational, Occupa-
tional, and Quality of Life Outcomes, 19 AM. J. SPEECH-LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY 51, 54
(2010).
7 See Theresa A. Belenchia & Thomas A. Crowe, Prevalence of Speech and Hearing
Disorders in a State Penitentiary Population, 16 J. COMM. DISORDERS 279, 281–83 (1983)
(finding higher rates of voice and hearing disorders in the incarcerated population
than in the general population); Nicholas Bountress & Jacqueline Richards, Speech,
Language and Hearing Disorders in an Adult Penal Population, 44 J. SPEECH & HEARING
DISORDERS 293, 295–99 (1979) (finding a high incidence of deficient language skills
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young people [= 21 years] who are involved in offending hav[e]
speech, language and communication needs.”8 Common deficien-
cies include “abstract language tasks . . . information processing
and narrative discourse.”9 Other research has shown that adoles-
cents and young adults with language impairments are substantially
more likely to be arrested than their non-impaired counterparts.10
And within juvenile and adult correctional institutions, language
disorders have been found at rates ranging from three to ten times
that of the general population.11
While these findings are certainly disconcerting, they are not
surprising, at least to language professionals. Speech-language
scholars have long known that language impairments frequently
occur in tandem with disabilities, deficits, and early-childhood con-
ditions endemic to defendant populations.12
in an adult male prison population); Abbe D. Davis et al., Language Skills of Delinquent
and Nondelinquent Adolescent Males, 24 J. COMM. DISORDERS 251, 252 (1991) (indicating
that between 58 to 84% of institutionalized delinquents had language and communi-
cation difficulties); Dixie Sanger et al., Prevalence of Language Problems Among Adolescent
Delinquents: A Closer Look, 23 COMM. DISORDERS Q. 17, 23 (2001) (explaining that
19.4% of female juvenile delinquents studied qualified for language services); Pamela
C. Snow & Martine B. Powell, Oral Language Competence, Social Skills and High-Risk Boys:
What Are Juvenile Offenders Trying to Tell Us?, 22 CHILD. & SOC’Y 16, 22 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter High-Risk Boys] (indicating that 52% of young male offenders studied had a lan-
guage impairment); Cynthia Olson Wagner et al., Communicative Disorders in a Group of
Adult Female Offenders, 16 J. COMM. DISORDERS 269 (1983) (revealing that 44% of incar-
cerated women studied had some form of speech-language deficiency).
8 Juliette Gregory & Karen Bryan, Speech and Language Therapy Intervention with a
Group of Persistent and Prolific Young Offenders in a Non-Custodial Setting with Previously
Undiagnosed Speech, Language and Communication Difficulties, 46 INT’L J. LANGUAGE
COMM. DISORDERS 202, 203 (2011).
9 High-Risk Boys, supra note 7, at 17; see also Pamela C. Snow & Martine B. Powell,
Oral Language Competence in Incarcerated Young Offenders: Links with Offending Severity, 13
INT’L J. SPEECH-LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY 1, 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter Incarcerated Young
Offenders].
10 E.B. Brownlie et al., Early Language Impairment and Young Adult Delinquent and
Aggressive Behavior, 32 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 453, 459–60, 463 (2004). These
findings are consistent with other studies that employ different methodologies. See,
e.g., Nancy J. Cohen et al., Language, Achievement, and Cognitive Processing in Psychiatri-
cally Disturbed Children with Previously Identified and Unsuspected Language Impairments, 39
J. CHILD PSYCHOL. PSYCHIATRY 865, 866 (1998). See also Sanger et al., supra note 7, at
23.
11 See sources cited supra note 7. See also Kathryn Stone & Karen Bryan, Unlocking
the Evidence, COUNS. MAG., Oct. 2010, at 35–37 (U.K.) (citing Karen Bryan, Jackie
Freer & Cheryl Furlong, Language and Communication Difficulties in Juvenile Offenders,
42 INT’L J. LANGUAGE & COMM. DISORDERS 505, 505–20 (2007)) (finding that at least
60% of young offenders have communication difficulties) (on file with coauthor Mi-
chele LaVigne).
12 See LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 45–65. This will be discussed fur-
ther in Section II.
72 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:69
The body of research confirming the high risk of language im-
pairments among juvenile and adult defendants raises a host of
questions about the quality of substantive and procedural justice
provided to these individuals. Due process and other constitutional
rights in juvenile and criminal court are, by their nature, language-
based and require a satisfactory level of linguistic and communica-
tive ability if they are to be accessed and exercised in a meaningful
fashion. A shortfall in an individual’s language and communica-
tion skills can reverberate throughout all stages of the legal pro-
cess, from interactions with law enforcement to sentencing and
even beyond.13
In an article published in 2011, we broadly surveyed the causes
and effects of language impairments, their prevalence among cli-
ent populations, and the extensive range of legal ramifications for
juvenile or adult defendants.14 We called that article “an attempt to
begin the conversation” about language disorders.15 We framed it
that way because, despite literature within the speech-language
field dating back as far as the 1920s, and the patently obvious rele-
vance of language disorders for legal and correctional profession-
als, the subject was virtually unknown in the American legal field.16
In this Article, we circle back to take a closer look at the im-
pact of language impairments within the context of the attorney-
client relationship. We chose to concentrate on this aspect of the
justice process because the attorney-client relationship is the con-
stitutional aspect that arguably has the most profound influence on
the overall quality of justice, yet is the most susceptible to interfer-
ence by language deficits.17 Language deficits are uniquely destruc-
13 See id. at 65–100.
14 See generally LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5.
15 Id. at 45.
16  See id. at 44–45, 91–93. Studies on the high rate of language impairments in
American correctional institutions appeared in the 1970s and 1980s. Unfortunately,
these studies did not gain traction and were not continued. Id. Studies of language
impairments in correctional institutions in Australia and Great Britain are ongoing.
See, e.g., Bryan, Freer & Furlong, supra note 11; Pamela C. Snow & Martine B. Powell,
Youth (In)justice: Oral Language Competence in Early Life and Risk for Engagement in Antiso-
cial Behaviour in Adolescence, 435 TRENDS & ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 1 (2012) (Austl.)
[hereinafter Youth (In)justice]. For a more detailed list of the studies conducted in the
U.S., Australia, and Great Britain, see sources cited supra note 7.
17 The late Frank Remington of the University of Wisconsin Law School antici-
pated Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012),
and Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), by twenty-five years when he wrote that
defense counsel should have “primary responsibility” for informed decision making
by a defendant. Frank J. Remington, The Changing Role of the Trial Judge in Criminal
Cases – Ensuring that the Sixth Amendment Right to Assistance of Counsel Is Effective, 20 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 339, 339 (1987).
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tive in this arena. While every client has a right to effective
assistance of counsel, counsel’s ability to provide effective assis-
tance is inextricably interconnected with the client’s reciprocal
ability to effectively assist counsel.18 And the client’s ability to effec-
tively assist counsel is inextricably interconnected with language.
Or to put it more simply, in the attorney-client relationship, com-
munication matters. In fact, communication is all there is.
In order to understand how language impairments can pro-
foundly affect the attorney-client relationship, legal practitioners
must appreciate the wide-ranging communicative and behavior im-
plications of language impairments, as well as the idiosyncratic na-
ture of a professional relationship that is as dependent upon the
communication skills of the consumer as those of the professional.
To that end, we have interwoven case law and forensic and legal
scholarship with speech-language scholarship. We  have also drawn
heavily from the expert opinions, observations, and stories of prac-
ticing attorneys—sources too often ignored in discussions of the
attorney-client relationship.
We structured this Article in a way we hope is accessible for
those who may have little familiarity with the concept of language
impairments, but who are interested in an issue that has ramifica-
tions for practice, policy, and research.19 As a preliminary matter,
we first provide a simplified introduction to language impair-
ments.20 Even though the subject of language impairments re-
18 We have relied on Schmidt, Reppucci, and Woolard’s definition of effective as-
sistance or participation. A client’s ability to effectively assist counsel refers to those
“abilities beyond those that are constitutionally required [for competency to stand
trial],” and that contribute to the development and operation of the attorney-client
relationship. Melinda G. Schmidt, N. Dickon Reppucci & Jennifer L. Woolard, Effec-
tiveness of Participation as a Defendant: The Attorney-Juvenile Client Relationship, 21 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 175, 176–77 (2003).
19 This Article is aimed primarily at juvenile and criminal defense attorneys. How-
ever, language impairments and their effects are highly relevant for attorneys who
practice in civil areas such as family, consumer, landlord-tenant, employment, and
disability, as well as quasi-criminal areas such as immigration and child protection.
20 We encourage readers desiring more in-depth information to review some of
the excellent literature on the long-term effects of language disorders and the preva-
lence of language impairments among juvenile and adult offenders. See, e.g., Joseph
H. Beitchman et al., Fourteen-Year Follow-Up of Speech/Language Impaired and Control Chil-
dren: Psychiatric Outcome, 40 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 75 (2001)
[hereinafter Fourteen-Year Follow-Up]; Johnson, Beitchman & Brownlie, supra note 6, at
51. For over twenty years, Beitchman, Johnson, and Brownlie have been engaged in
the Ottawa Language Study, a prospective longitudinal study of individuals with and
without a history of early speech/language impairments. See Fourteen-Year Follow-Up, at
51; Johnson, Beitchman & Brownlie, supra note 6. Beitchman, Johnson, and Brownlie
have published findings regarding the status of the individuals at ages 12, 19, and 25.
See also Karen Bryan, Preliminary Study of the Prevalence of Speech and Language Difficulties
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mains relatively unknown in the legal world, many of the
behavioral and communicative effects will actually be quite familiar
to practitioners.
We next look at language impairments in the context of the
attorney-client relationship. Competency to stand trial is the obvi-
ous first stop, given the connection between communication and
the constitutional requirement that a defendant be able to assist
counsel.21 However, for most attorneys, it will be the client who is
impaired but not legally incompetent who presents the greater
(and much more frequent) challenge. Therefore, the bulk of our
discussion focuses on those clients. Specifically, we look at what
happens when a client’s language impairments interfere with func-
tions that are essential to the successful operation of an attorney-
client relationship.
Finally, we consider potential remedies and accommodations
for a problem that may, at first blush, seem intractable. These solu-
tions are not just for lawyers, however. Given the significance of
this issue for the quality of justice, language impairments cannot
simply be “the lawyer’s problem,” but are the responsibility of all
actors in the criminal justice system.
I. LANGUAGE IMPAIRMENTS IN A NUTSHELL
The term “language impairments” (or “language disorders”)
encompasses a broad constellation of deficits. Language impair-
ments fall into three categories: receptive, expressive, and pragmat-
ics. Receptive and expressive deficits are exactly what the words
suggest—problems understanding or expressing language. These
deficits affect skills such as syntax, vocabulary, and semantics that
we typically associate with language, and can be readily tested with
standardized instruments.22 On a functional level, receptive and
in Young Offenders, 39 INT’L J. LANGUAGE COMM. DISORDERS 391 (2004) [hereinafter
Preliminary Study]; High-Risk Boys, supra note 7.
21 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
22 E.B. Brownlie et al., supra note 10, at 454. Whether an individual is classified as
having a “language impairment” based on test scores depends to a certain extent on
who is asking and for what purpose. Researchers often use an inclusive cutoff (one
standard deviation below the mean), which is consistent with speech-language pathol-
ogists’ (SLP) referrals and judgments. Fourteen-Year Follow-Up, supra note 20, at 77.
More stringent criteria are usually applied to determine qualification for publicly
funded services. The Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, for example, re-
quires that a student score 1.75 standard deviations below the mean for his or her
chronological age to be classified as having a language impairment for special educa-
tion purposes. WIS. ADMIN. CODE CH. PI § 11.36(5)(b)(1) (2009–10).
2013] “HE GOT IN MY FACE SO I SHOT HIM” 75
expressive deficits affect the ability to comprehend meaning and to
recall and relate information.
The third category, pragmatics, is less tangible. Pragmatics are
generally defined as “the behavioral effects[ ] of communication,”
and they govern the use and understanding of language in con-
text.23 Pragmatics are different from other linguistic concepts such
as vocabulary, syntax, and processing in that pragmatics are con-
cerned with the effect of a speaker’s communication choices and
styles on the receiver and with the corresponding effect of the re-
ceiver’s reaction on the speaker.24 Pragmatic competence refers to
the communicative and cognitive skills that enable a speaker to
successfully function as a social being in variety of contexts. Prag-
matic incompetence reveals itself in a lack of social cognition,25 an
inability to take the perspective of the other person,26 and a failure
to appropriately adapt in interactions.27
Language impairments arise when the language acquisition
process goes awry during childhood. The cause may be an un-
derlying communication disorder such as hearing loss,28 auditory
processing disorders,29 or external conditions such as extreme pov-
23 PAUL WATZLAWICK ET AL., PRAGMATICS OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION: A STUDY OF
INTERACTIONAL PATTERNS, PATHOLOGIES, AND PARADOXES 22 (1967); see also Robert L.
Russell, Social Communication Impairments: Pragmatics, 54 PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM.
483, 484 (2007) (defining pragmatics as “the communicative use of language and
gesture in context”).
24 WATZLAWICK ET AL., supra note 23, at 22.
25 “Social cognition refers to the knowledge, processing and application of cultur-
ally relevant (and often quite subtle) behaviour that assists in establishing and main-
taining interpersonal relationships of varying degrees of intimacy and complexity.”
Youth (In)justice, supra note 16, at 2 (citing Curtis D. Hardin & Terri D. Conley, A
Relational Approach to Cognition: Shared Experience and Relationship Affirmation in Social
Cognition, in COGNITIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE PRINCETON SYMPOSIUM ON THE LEG-
ACY AND FUTURE OF SOCIAL COGNITION 3 (Gordon B. Moskowitz ed., 2001)).
26 See LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 60 (citing Philip S. Dale, Language
and Emotion: A Developmental Perspective, in LANGUAGE, LEARNING, AND BEHAVIOR DISOR-
DERS 8 (Joseph H. Beitchman et al. eds., 1996)); Ethan Remmel et al., Theory of Mind
Development in Deaf Children, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF DEAF STUDIES, LANGUAGE, AND
EDUCATION 113, 125 (Mark Marschark & Patricia E. Spencer eds., 2003); Heidemarie
Lohmann et al., Linguistic Communication and Social Understanding, in WHY LANGUAGE
MATTERS FOR THEORY OF MIND, 245, 261–63 (Janet Wilde Astington & Jodie A. Baird
eds., 2005). For a discussion of theory of mind, see infra Section D.
27 Russell, supra note 23, at 483.
28 For a discussion of the effects of congenital or early-childhood hearing loss, see
Michele LaVigne & McCay Vernon, An Interpreter Isn’t Enough: Deafness, Language, and
Due Process, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 843, 852–65 (2003).
29 Auditory processing disorders are “hearing impairment(s) arising from pathol-
ogy of the brain.” D-E Bamiou et al., Aetiology and Clinical Presentations of Auditory
Processing Disorders—A Review, 85 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILD. 361, 361 (2001).
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erty,30 maltreatment, or neglect.31 Language impairments may
also co-occur with any number of associated disorders includ-
ing ADHD, learning disabilities, and pervasive developmental
disorders.32
Unfortunately, despite decades of research on causes and ef-
fects, and the well-documented high rates of occurrence among
certain groups of individuals, language deficits among children are
often still unrecognized and untreated, and persist into adoles-
cence and adulthood.33 Research has shown that unidentified lan-
guage impairments are especially prevalent among offenders.34
Language impairments have an insidious quality. Language
disorders have as much to do with long-term academic, cognitive,
social, emotional, and behavioral dysfunction, as with low vocabu-
30 See generally BETTY HART & TODD R. RISLEY, MEANINGFUL DIFFERENCES IN THE EVE-
RYDAY EXPERIENCE OF YOUNG AMERICAN CHILDREN (1995) (connection between socio-
economic status and language deficits). For a discussion of the connection between
language impairments and poverty, see LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at
51–53. The connection between language deficits and poverty is becoming an issue of
great concern for many educators. See, e.g., Ginia Bellafante, Before a Test, a Poverty of
Words, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/nyregion/
for-poor-schoolchildren-a-poverty-of-words.html.
31 See LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 53–54; Pamela C. Snow, Martine B.
Powell & Dixie D. Sanger, Oral Language Competence, Young Speakers, and the Law, 43
LANGUAGE, SPEECH & HEARING SERVICES IN SCHS. 496, 497–98 (2012) [hereinafter
Young Speakers].
32 See, e.g., Joseph H. Beitchman et al., Prevalence of Psychiatric Disorders in Children
with Speech and Language Disorders, 25 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 528, 532–33
(1986); Dennis P. Cantwell & Lorian Baker, Association Between Attention Deficit-Hyperac-
tivity Disorder and Learning Disorders, 24 J. LEARNING DISABILITIES 88, 88–94 (1991). See
also LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 49–51. There is also a disorder known as
specific language impairment (SLI). This disorder produces language deficits and
associated difficulties that “are not directly attributable to neurological or speech
mechanism abnormalities, sensory impairments, mental retardation, or environmen-
tal factors.” Eva Arkkila et al., Specific Language Impairment in Childhood Is Associated with
Impaired Mental and Social Well-being in Adulthood, 33 LOGOPEDIC PHONIATRICS
VOCOLOGY 179, 179 (2008).
33 See, e.g., Gregory & Bryan, supra note 8, at 211–12.
34 See Incarcerated Young Offenders, supra note 9, at 481; see also Pamela C. Snow &
Dixie D. Sanger, Restorative Justice Conferencing and the Youth Offender: Exploring the Role
of Oral Language Competence, 46 INT’L J. LANGUAGE & COMM. DISORDERS 324, 329
(2011) [hereinafter Restorative Justice Conferencing]; Bryan, Freer & Furlong, supra note
11, at 507–08; Cohen et al., supra note 10, at 866, 872–73 (demonstrating that chil-
dren and adolescents with previously unidentified language disorders were more
likely to show aggressive and delinquent behavior); Glyn Jones & Jenny Talbot, No One
Knows: The Bewildering Passage of Offenders with Learning Disability and Learning Difficulty
Through the Criminal Justice System, 20 CRIM. BEHAVIOUR & MENTAL HEALTH 1, 1–2
(2010) (U.K.) (explaining that in Great Britain, the Prison Reform Trust created the
“No One Knows” program to deal with the “hidden problem” of inmates with “signifi-
cant problems with understanding and communication”).
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lary scores and poor grammar.35 Their effects can be life-altering
and frequently remain long after the individual has acquired suffi-
cient language to get by on a day-to-day basis.36
The array of potential deficiencies brought about by language
impairments is vast, even when we confine our discussion to “only”
those deficits that directly relate to communication within the at-
torney-client relationship. This list, culled from studies and litera-
ture reviews, illustrates the depth and breadth of potential effects
that are likely to impede the ability to assist counsel:
• poor vocabulary;
• difficulty processing complex sentences;
• difficulty following directions;
• deficient auditory memory;
• staying on topic;
• poor reading skills;
• deficient narrative skills (both expressive and receptive);
• inability to grasp inferences;
• lack of background knowledge;
• difficulty learning new material;
• limited ability to seek clarification;
• limited ability to recognize and articulate emotional states;
• difficulty reading social cues;
• insensitivity to cause and effect;
• inability to recognize and control inappropriate behavior;
• inability to interpret the motivations and thoughts of
others; and
35 The literature on the prevalence of language disorders among those with identi-
fied behavioral, psychiatric, and emotional disorders is voluminous. For helpful litera-
ture reviews, see generally Joseph H. Beitchman et al., Linguistic Impairment and
Psychiatric Disorder: Pathways to Outcome, in LANGUAGE, LEARNING, AND BEHAVIOR DISOR-
DERS 493, 493–514 (Joseph H. Beitchman et al., eds. 1996) (giving a general overview
of linguistic impairments and cognitive disorders); Ginette Dionne, Language Develop-
ment and Aggressive Behavior, in DEVELOPMENTAL ORIGINS OF AGGRESSION 330, 330–52
(Richard E. Tremblay et al., eds. 2005) (covering language deficits and their result in
aggression); see also Maria Carlson To¨rnqvist et al., Adult People With Language Impair-
ment and Their Life Situation, 30 COMM. DISORDERS Q. 237, 238–39 (2009) (discussing
the effects of language impairments on social development); Arlene R. Young et al.,
Young Adult Academic Outcomes in a Longitudinal Sample of Early Identified Language Im-
paired and Control Children, 43 J. OF CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 635, 642–43 (2002)
(finding that early development of language impairments results in long-term aca-
demic problems).
36 Johnson, Beitchman & Brownlie, supra note 6, at 60–62; Joseph H. Beitchman &
E.B. Brownlie, Childhood Speech and Language Disorders, in DO THEY GROW OUT OF IT?
LONG-TERM OUTCOMES OF CHILDHOOD DISORDERS 225, 225–53 (Lily Hechtman ed.,
1996); Fourteen-Year Follow-Up, supra note 20, at 75–78.
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• deficits in higher-order skills such as self-monitoring, plan-
ning, and appreciation of consequences.37
Obviously, not every linguistically impaired individual will
manifest deficits in every sphere of communication. The effects on
a particular person will depend on factors such as the type and
severity of disorder, home environment, and presence or absence
of early intervention.38 Nor will every deficit be readily apparent. In
fact, many impaired older adolescents and adults sound “normal”
(though perhaps abrupt, reluctant, or rude) to the uninitiated.39
Nevertheless, as a class, language disorders are practically tailor-
made to disrupt the attorney-client relationship.
II. LANGUAGE IMPAIRMENTS AND COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
When considering communication dysfunction in the context
of the attorney-client relationship, the question of competency to
stand trial inevitably comes to mind. Courts have long relied on
some variation of the Dusky standard, which requires that a crimi-
nal defendant have “sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and “a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.”40 In 1996, in Cooper v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court made
the language and competency link more explicit by defining the
ability to consult with counsel as the ability to “communicate effec-
tively with counsel.”41  By that definition, language impairments
are as relevant to a client’s competency to stand trial as mental
illness or intellectual disability.
An individual’s language skills are evaluated by means of spe-
cialized instruments administered and interpreted by a speech-lan-
guage pathologist (SLP). For example, a common assessment tool
used with individuals ages five to twenty-one is the Clinical Evalua-
tion of Language Fundamentals, Fourth Edition (CELF-4).42 CELF-
37 See, e.g., Gerard H. Poll et al., Identification of Clinical Markers of Specific Language
Impairment in Adults, 53 J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE & HEARING RES. 414, 414–17 (2010);
High-Risk Boys, supra note 7, at 16–18; LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 43–44.
38 Young et al., supra note 35, at 635–36.
39 We must not overlook the humiliation and insecurity that accompany language
impairments and the resultant desire to hide personal deficits. See Youth (In)justice,
supra note 16, at 1–2; see also Pamela C. Snow & Martine B. Powell, What’s the Story? An
Exploration of Narrative Language Abilities in Male Juvenile Offenders, 11 PSYCHOL. CRIME &
L. 239 (2005) [hereinafter What’s the Story?].
40 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
41 517 U.S. 348, 368 (1996).
42 See Assessment and Information: Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals®—
Fourth Edition (CELF® -4), PEARSON EDUCATION, INC., http://www.pearsonassessments.
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4 includes a series of subtests and scales that measure a variety of
essential communicative tasks such as auditory comprehension and
recall, ability to follow directions, and comprehension of social
rules.43 Instruments like CELF-444 are more finely tuned to the lay-
ers of language than measures typically relied on by courts such as
Verbal IQ or clinical assessments.45  They also tell us much more
about a defendant’s actual communicative capabilities and how
they are likely to play out with an attorney, especially when they are
used in conjunction with a dedicated competency assessment tool
like the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Criminal Adju-
dication (MAC-CAT-CA).
While language assessments are hardly standard in the compe-
tency process,46 a few lawyers have reported that they have supple-
mented competency evaluations with language assessments in
selected cases where they believe the client’s extremely poor lan-
com/HAIWEB/Cultures/en-us/Productdetail.htm?Pid=015-8037-200 (last visited
Dec. 13, 2013).
43 Teresa Paslawski, The Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals, Fourth Edition
(CELF-4): A Review, 20 CANADIAN J. SCH. PSYCHOL. 129, 131 (2005).
44 Another commonly used standardized instrument is the Test of Adolescent/
Adult Language (TOAL-4). See Test of Adolescent and Adult Language—Fourth Edition,
PRO ED, INC., http://www.proedinc.com/customer/productView.aspx?ID=4004 (last
visited Dec. 13, 2013).
45 “Although verbal IQ and language ability are related, the two constructs are
conceptually distinct. The differences between verbal IQ and language ability are re-
flected in their measurement and scoring. Language ability includes . . . receptive and
expressive semantics, morphology, and syntax. Verbal IQ measures do not systemati-
cally assess these aspects of language. For instance, Wechsler verbal IQ scales focus on
acquired knowledge rather than language ability.” Brownlie et al., supra note 10, at
454. According to Australian psychologist Pamela Snow, speech-language pathologists
(SLPs) do not rely on Verbal IQ as a measure of language skill:
One problem is that verbal IQ represents . . . quite “static” skills,
and . . . it is unrealistic to reduce a wide variety of complex sub-skills
down to one score. SLPs think in a number of dimensions – receptive
language (comprehension) [versus] expressive language, and also look
at a number of aspects of language – phonology (use of the sounds
system in one’s language), semantics (vocabulary), syntax (sentence
complexity), and pragmatics (the culturally determined set of social
“rules” about how language is used). We . . . “dissect” language compe-
tence, which is why we use a number of different measures. . . . One of
the most important composite skills is narrative language – the ability to
apply a “template” that enables the logical sequencing of novel informa-
tion for a listener who is naive about events. This has obvious forensic
implications, but a verbal IQ score would only have a modest correla-
tion with narrative skill.
E-mail from Pamela Snow, Assoc. Prof., Monash University-Australia, to co-author Mi-
chele LaVigne (Aug. 11, 2011) (on file with co-author Michele LaVigne).
46 Given that the legal profession is just beginning to recognize the existence and
significance of language impairments, the absence of language assessments is to be
expected. See LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 43–45.
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guage skills exacerbate his or her immaturity or learning disabili-
ties. These assessments shed important light on functional deficits
that were overlooked in the ordinary competency process. In a
Dane County, Wisconsin case, for example, a language assessment
placed the juvenile client’s expressive and receptive skills in the
bottom percentile of individuals his age, deficits that had been
missed not only by the client’s school, but also in the initial compe-
tency evaluation.47 Based on these low scores, both the evaluating
psychologist (who had originally opined that the juvenile was likely
to become competent within a year) and the court determined that
the juvenile was incompetent, and unlikely to become competent
within the statutory time period.
Although such low language scores may seem extreme, re-
search and experience have shown that they are not uncommon
among individuals in the juvenile and criminal justice systems.48
These findings are a clear indication that the number of juvenile
and criminal defendants who lack the constitutionally required
ability to “communicate effectively with counsel” is probably much
47 In this case the evaluating psychologist originally found that the juvenile was
“likely to become competent with further education about the legal system and his
legal rights.” After receiving a copy of the language assessment that placed the juve-
nile in the bottom fourth to fifth percentile in ability to follow directions and recall
information, the evaluator revised her opinion to state: “He is not likely to become
competent within a 12 month period.” Significantly, despite the youth’s severe lan-
guage impairments, his school had determined that he “did not have special educa-
tion or learning disability needs.” Reports from In re D.S., Dane Cnty., Wis. (on file
with co-author Michele LaVigne) (permission to use documents granted by trial court
judge, defense attorney, and prosecutor). In Massachusetts, a juvenile was found in-
competent when her attorney provided the court a language assessment that placed
the client’s receptive and expressive skills below the first percentile. E-mail from At-
torney A.P. to co-author Michele LaVigne (Jan. 10, 2013) (on file with co-author Mi-
chele LaVigne).
48 At Mendota Juvenile Treatment Center (MJTC), a mental health facility for
male offenders in juvenile corrections in Madison, Wis., testing has revealed that up
to 25% of the boys have receptive and expressive language skills in the bottom first
percentile. When asked about these children’s ability to comprehend the legal process,
a staff member questioned, “How could these kids possibly be competent?” LaVigne &
Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 41–42, 67. See also Bryan, Freer & Furlong, supra note
11, at 515 (indicating that 46 to 67% of offenders in juvenile correctional facility
scored within poor or very poor category on language assessments, compared with 9%
of general adolescent population); Young Speakers, supra note 31, at 502 (citing Debra
J. Blanton & Paul A. Dagenais, Comparison of Language Skills of Adjudicated and
Nonadjudicated Adolescent Males and Females, 38 LANGUAGE, SPEECH & HEARING SERVICES
IN SCHS. 309, 309–14 (2007)) (positing that international studies show that between
19% and 60% of young offenders experience clinical levels of impairment); Sanger et
al., supra note 7, at 23 (19.4% of female juvenile offenders studied qualified for lan-
guage services); Preliminary Study, supra note 20, at 391–400; High-Risk Boys, supra note
7, at 16–28; Incarcerated Young Offenders, supra note 9, at 480–89.
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higher than we have allowed ourselves to believe, and that ques-
tions of functional language ability properly belong in competency
considerations.
III. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP: WHAT LAWYERS SAY
“Doctors and judges don’t understand the subtle level of assisting
counsel.”49
Most defendants with language impairments will be found or pre-
sumed competent, not because they are able to competently assist
counsel, but because of the nature of the entire competency enter-
prise. While forensic scholars consider competency to stand trial to
be “the most significant mental health inquiry pursued in the sys-
tem of criminal law,”50 as a statistical and practical matter it is only
of marginal relevance in the actual operation of the juvenile and
criminal justice systems.51 The constitutional threshold for a find-
ing of competency is low52 and inconsistently applied.53 Legal prac-
49 Attorney D, see infra notes 58–59.
50 Gianni Pirelli et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Competency to Stand Trial Research, 17
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 2 (2011) (citing ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND
LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 200 (1975)).
51 See, e.g., Norman G. Poythress et al., Client Abilities to Assist Counsel and Make
Decisions in Criminal Cases, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 437, 450 (1994) (demonstrating
that lawyers actually raised competency to stand trial with only a fraction of the clients
whose competency they doubted).
52 See, e.g., Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2013), aff’g United States
ex rel. Newman v. Rednour, 917 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (granting habeas
relief for defendant with IQ of 62). In Newman, the trial court had denied a post-
conviction request for an evidentiary hearing on competency, stating: “If he was
drooling or if his eyes were going someplace, counsel, I assure you, I would have sua
sponte asked for a fitness hearing.” 917 F. Supp. 2d at 771. In Pierce County, Wis., a
trial court judge denied a request for a competency evaluation, stating: “I think we
have to keep competency to the very few cases where, clearly, this person doesn’t have
a clue what’s going on.” In re Zachary A., No. 2009AP2091, 2010 WL 916879, at *1
(Wis. Ct. App., Mar. 16, 2010) (reversing the trial court). See also Hibbert v. Poole, 415
F. Supp. 2d 225, 240–41 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding defendant with an IQ of 59 compe-
tent because he had lived independently and been employed, and because the defen-
dant “himself never informed anyone at any time that he was having difficulty
understanding what was occurring in his criminal proceeding”); United States v. Wen-
zel, 497 F. Supp. 489, 490–91 (D. Nev. 1980) (finding defendant with an IQ of 55–60
competent); People v. Henderson, 404 N.E.2d 392, 395–96 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (find-
ing defendant with IQ of 62 competent, despite psychiatrist’s testimony that a person
with the defendant’s IQ would have great difficulty understanding concepts and read-
ing and understanding language).
53 “Because judicial determinations almost always rest entirely on the recommen-
dation of experts, and because those experts generally do not explain either their
methodology or the basis for their conclusions, it is very difficult to know what under-
lies most adjudicative competence decisions.” Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence,
“Rational Understanding,” and the Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1400
(citing THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND IN-
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titioners regard the whole process with skepticism, and rarely raise
it, even when they have doubts about a client’s ability to adequately
communicate.54
The fact that a client clears the competency bar in no way
means that the attorney-client relationship can operate as it
should.55 There is vast territory between the minimal standard for
competency and the ability to effectively participate in the attor-
ney-client relationship.56 It is in this expanse that the effects of lan-
guage impairment on both the lawyer’s and the client’s ability to
do their jobs are most likely to be felt.
Anybody who wishes to understand the implications of a cli-
ent’s communication deficits on the attorney-client relationship
and the quality of representation must be willing to delve into the
nuanced and often messy world of juvenile and criminal defense.
For us, the authors, that meant talking to lawyers. Scholarship and
commentary, practice standards, and traditional case law obviously
factor into the discussion, but we have chosen to give lawyers a
leading voice because they are on the frontlines, bearing the ethi-
cal, constitutional, and practical responsibility for the attorney-cli-
ent relationship. It is therefore vital that they be allowed to explain
the often-painful realities of representing the client who lacks the
tools to effectively communicate and assist in return.
For this Article, we talked with eleven lawyers with seven to
forty-two years of experience in criminal or juvenile defense. These
attorneys were handpicked based on several criteria including geo-
graphic and practice diversity (i.e., state vs. federal; juvenile vs.
adult; private practice vs. public defender).57 We have labeled the
STRUMENTS 69, 79 (2d ed. 2003)) (emphasis in original). See also Mark C. Bardwell &
Bruce A. Arrigo, Competency to Stand Trial: A Law, Psychology, and Policy Assessment, 30 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 147, 149 (2002).
54 Poythress et al., supra note 51, at 450. See also Ron Kuby & William M. Kunstler,
So Crazy He Thinks He Is Sane: The Colin Ferguson Trial and the Competency Standard, 5
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 19 (1995).
55 See State v. Shields, 593 A.2d 986, 987, 993, 1011 (Del. Super. Ct. 1990) (finding
defendant with a serious language disorder competent, placing burden on defense
attorney to compensate for any deficits, and stating, “[t]he fact that a defendant
might not understand the proceedings unless they are explained to him in simple
language would put an additional burden on defense counsel, but certainly does not
establish that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial”).
56 Schmidt, Reppuci & Woolard, supra note 18, at 176–77.
57 The attorneys practice in three Midwestern states and one Western state. They
practice in jurisdictions that range from major metropolitan areas with dozens of
judges on the criminal or juvenile bench to rural counties with a single judge. Five of
the attorneys are women and six are men. Two of the attorneys are African-American;
the rest are white. The attorneys were selected based on reputation within the profes-
sion as practitioners, policymakers, leaders, and trainers. Their standing was signifi-
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lawyers as Attorneys A to K in order to protect their anonymity, since
most of them were quite open—and not always favorable—in their
assessments of the legal process.58
The overarching themes in the conversations included what it
means to provide effective representation in the best practices
sense; how a client’s language and language-based skills factor in
the effective operation of the attorney-client relationship; and the
problems that arise when those skills are missing. The subject of
competency to stand trial did come up occasionally, but compe-
tency was seen as a parallel universe that is seldom if ever visited;59
a universe that is more concerned with moving cases along60 than
with the attorney-client relationship.61 The constitutional standard
for effective assistance of counsel was similarly mentioned, but it
was dismissed as unhelpful, or worse.62
cant for us because it meant that the attorneys had spoken with and observed
countless other lawyers, and had considerable experience identifying, conversing
about, and helping to remedy issues confronting lawyers in the trenches. Co-author
Michele LaVigne conducted the actual interviews. Nine were in person and two were
by phone. All observations and conclusions about the lawyers’ attitudes, moods, and
behavior are the responsibility of co-author LaVigne. The attorneys were all provided
with a copy of this Article for comment before it was submitted for publication.
58 For each attorney we have provided the date of the attorney’s initial bar admis-
sion in parentheses and a general statement of the type of law practice:
 Attorney A: (1983) public defender (county), now clinical professor of law.
 Attorney B: (1977) appellate defender (state).
 Attorney C: (1992) private practice, former public defender (state).
 Attorney D: (1985) public defender (state).
 Attorney E: (1985) private practice (federal and state), former federal defender.
 Attorney F: (1971) private practice (federal and state), death penalty defense.
 Attorney G: (2006) private practice, half-time contract defender (county).
 Attorney H: (1989) public defender (state).
 Attorney I: (1982) private practice, former public defender (state).
 Attorney J: (1980) public defender (state).
 Attorney K: (1983) public defender (state), former federal defender.
59 Attorney F said that his state does not use competency assessment instruments
such as the MacArthur (MA-CAT-CA) but still relies on “a drive-by” method of assess-
ing competency. See LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 28, at 927. He said that the client
has “got to be really dysfunctional before you get to the evaluation.”
60 Attorney E noted that a finding of incompetency means the system must “com-
mit money and time”—both of which are in short supply, especially in state courts.
Co-author Gregory Van Rybroek teaches psychology graduate students how to con-
duct competency assessments. He tells the students that the evaluator is always under
pressure to participate in the process of “mushing” defendants through the system. In
fact, on the ground, the system is specifically designed to “mush” toward a disposition.
The competency question simply slows the process.
61 Attorney H said that forensic specialists and judges have “no idea what it means
to participate or communicate with counsel.” Attorney I was in agreement: “Judges
don’t all know how difficult it can be to communicate with clients and what it takes to
represent someone.”
62 The ineffective assistance of counsel framework has been criticized as a “doctri-
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Prior to becoming involved in this project, none of the attor-
neys were aware of language disorder or impairment as a diagnos-
tic category per se and none recalled seeing language impairments
mentioned in clients’ records.63 This lack of awareness was not sur-
prising, given the high rate of unidentified language impairments
and the general lack of familiarity about language deficits in the
legal system.64 Nevertheless, all of the attorneys instinctively “knew”
they had represented many clients with language impairments (the
term “inarticulate” was commonly used) and had observed many of
the manifestations and symptoms described in Section II. A num-
ber of the attorneys also expressed relief at having an evidence-
based explanation for difficulties that previously seemed unex-
plainable or attributable to a character flaw. Of course, none of
these experienced attorneys were so naı¨ve as to believe that all of
their clients’ problems are language-based. They were well aware
that they have clients whose difficulties are caused by personality
disorders or just a general desire to disrupt or not cooperate. How-
ever, the fact that default characterizations such as “bad attitude,”
“lying,” “no remorse,” or “non-compliant” are not always accurate
was welcome news and affirmed what the lawyers had already
intuited.
What emerged from these conversations is a portrait of the
attorney-client relationship as a complicated, organic event, one
that transcends the mechanistic descriptions that too often inform
competency assessments, ineffective assistance of counsel analyses,
or judges’ observations. As we discuss below, the attorney-client re-
lationship is not a series of tasks centered on the exchange of infor-
mation and “facts.”  Rather, it is a sophisticated, symbiotic
relationship in which the lawyer’s ability to effectively respond to a
client’s needs depends directly on the client’s ability to provide in-
formative narratives, articulate emotional states, anticipate the
nal placeholder—something that had to be recognized in principle . . . but that ought
in practice to be discouraged.” Michael M. O’Hear, Bypassing Habeas: The Right to Effec-
tive Assistance Requires Earlier Supreme Court Intervention in Cases of Attorney Incompetence,
25 FED. SENT’G REP. 110, 111 (2012). Attorney E called the Sixth Amendment “the
floor” and said that the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel was “ridiculous.”
63 Prior to each interview, the attorneys were either asked to read LaVigne and
Van Rybroek, supra note 5, which reviews social science literature describing language
impairments and their effects, or received an oral summary. We took this step be-
cause, despite decades of research and volumes of literature about language impair-
ments, they are not yet widely recognized or discussed within the legal world.
64 See Incarcerated Young Offenders, supra note 9, at 481; Restorative Justice Conferencing,
supra note 34, at 329; Bryan, Freer & Furlong, supra note 11, at 507–08; Cohen et al.,
supra note 10, at 866, 872.
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thoughts and reactions of others (including the lawyer), and con-
textualize the abstractions of the legal system. When this relation-
ship breaks down because of the client’s inability to meet those
demands, the effects can scuttle the representation.
IV. THE ESSENTIALS OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND
THE IMPACT OF LANGUAGE IMPAIRMENTS
“Lawyers and people who can’t communicate are a bad combination.”65
A. Navigating the Attorney-Client Relationship Itself
A fundamental requirement for any client is the ability to un-
derstand what the attorney-client relationship is about and to func-
tion appropriately within it.66 In fact, many of the attorneys we
talked with considered this a make-or-break skill that will influence
the entire course of any representation. The ability to work with an
attorney means more than an understanding that the lawyer is the
client’s advocate. Absent some kind of delusional thinking, even
the most unsophisticated defendants usually have some sense that
the lawyer is there to help, though they may be confused or mis-
taken about what that help might entail.67 Rather, the lawyers were
talking about a client’s ability to appreciate and maneuver within a
seemingly counterfactual agency relationship in which the client is
the “boss.”68
The attorney-client relationship has long been recognized as a
principal/agent relationship with the lawyer acting on behalf of
the client. This rationale is behind the legal concept of “waiver,” in
65 Attorney A.
66 “[T]he quality of the attorney-client relationship is important in the effective
representation of all clients regardless of their categorization as competent or incom-
petent.” Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L. Brodsky, Attorney-Client Trust Among Con-
victed Criminal Defendants: Preliminary Examination of the Attorney-Client Trust Scale, 20
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 69, 70 (2002). See Schmidt, Reppuci & Woolard, supra note 18, at
177.
67 Lack of understanding of what an attorney can and cannot do is hardly limited
to poor, linguistically deficient individuals charged in criminal court. Middle-class di-
vorce clients make similar mistakes. See, e.g., Marsha Kline Pruett & Tamara D. Jack-
son, The Lawyer’s Role During the Divorce Process: Perceptions of Parents, Their Young
Children and Their Attorneys, 33 FAM. L.Q. 283, 296–97 (1999). However, the type of
dysfunction we are talking about here is much more basic.
68 We have borrowed the term “boss” from Attorney Ben Gonring of Madison, who
tells his juvenile clients that they are his “boss.” Interview with Ben Gonring, Assistant
State Public Defender, Juvenile Division, in Madison, Wis. (Sept. 4, 2009). We
presented that term to the attorneys during the interviews as a shorthand means of
describing the agency relationship between attorney and client. A number of them
ran with it.
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which an attorney’s actions or inactions are attributed to the client.
As principal in this relationship, the client is responsible for all de-
cisions relating to the objectives of the representation and the law-
yer is responsible for carrying out his or her wishes.69
Researchers have known for at least two decades that this
model is difficult for younger adolescents.70 Attorney A described
her juvenile clients as having no idea “what they’re supposed to do
with a lawyer.” However, individuals with language disorders may
not grow out of those misconceptions and interactional difficulties
even at age twenty, or twenty-five.71 Studies have repeatedly shown
that older juveniles and adults with language impairments are less
likely to have developed a skill set which would enable to them to
assume the “directive role” with an attorney. Individuals with lan-
guage impairments will have achieved lower levels of education,72
will be more likely to be dependent on parents, siblings, and—in
more severe cases—social services,73 and will have increased levels
of anxiety and social phobia.74 This will leave them greatly dimin-
ished in any situation where language is power. Not only will they
be less likely to be comfortable with their directive role, they may
not know what it means or how to do it because they will have
never done it.
The standard response is usually to exhort the attorney to
spend more time and “explain carefully,” but such simplistic advice
overlooks the fact that such a relationship represents a tectonic
shift in how these clients interact with the world. Moreover, the
client must be able to receive and process that information about
the role of counsel, make sense of it, and apply it.75 Attorney E, a
69 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2012) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a
client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and . . . shall consult
with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take
such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the repre-
sentation . . . . In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and
whether the client will testify.”).
70 See, e.g., Vance L. Cowden & Geoffrey R. McKee, Competency to Stand Trial in
Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings—Cognitive Maturity and the Attorney-Client Relationship, 33
U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 629, 641–44 (1995).
71 See generally Johnson, Beitchman & Brownlie, supra note 6, at 60–63.
72 Id. at 61.
73 See, e.g., To¨rnqvist et al., supra note 35, at 238; Michael Rutter & Lynn Mawhood,
The Long-Term Psychosocial Sequelae of Specific Developmental Disorders of Speech and Lan-
guage, in BIOLOGICAL RISK FACTORS FOR PSYCHOSOCIAL DISORDERS 233, 249 (Michael
Rutter & Paul Caesar eds., 1991).
74 See, e.g., Sabrina C. Voci et al., Social Anxiety in Late Adolescence: The Importance of
Early Childhood Language Impairment, 20 ANXIETY DISORDERS 915, 924–27 (2006).
75 Schmidt, Reppuci & Woolard, supra note 18, at 177–78.
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veteran defense attorney with state and federal experience, re-
flected on how the principal/agent relationship would make little
sense to the uninitiated: “ ‘You’re the boss and I’m your agent.’
What does that mean? ‘Help me help you.’ What are you asking me
to do?” Attorney A, who has long specialized in the defense of
young juveniles and adolescents raised in extreme urban poverty,
cut to the chase when she said, “ ‘You’re the boss’ means nothing if
you have never been the boss of anything, and simply telling some-
one it’s so doesn’t make it so.”
Even if a linguistically impaired individual can grasp a rela-
tionship in which he is in charge of the professional with the edu-
cation and status, he must still have the skills to make that
relationship work. A crucial skill is the ability to ask questions.76
Attorney F, a private practitioner who specializes in complex crimi-
nal litigation, specifically defined the clients’ role as asking “a lot of
questions.” Yet as he and others noted, many clients do not ask
questions. Attorney F attributed some of this to a lack of power:
“People are so used to not being allowed to ask questions, the
whole notion of asking a question doesn’t compute.”
But the lack of questions must also be attributed to clients’
linguistic and emotional inability to ask them. Indeed, language
disorders are often marked by a long-standing lack of ability to seek
clarification,77 and to use questions as a means of negotiating diffi-
cult or unfamiliar circumstances.78 Individuals with language disor-
ders have also developed the ability to “hide incompetencies,”79
and to adopt a survival mechanism that Attorney A claimed was
very much like that seen in first-year law students: “I don’t have a
clue what you’re talking about but don’t make me look stupid.”
Meanwhile, the lawyer has no way of gauging how much the client
does or does not understand of the attorney-client relationship and
76 The consumer’s ability to ask questions also factors into the successful doctor-
patient relationship. S. Willems et al., Socio-economic Status of the Patient and Doctor-Pa-
tient Communication: Does It Make a Difference?, 56 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 139,
140 (2005).
77 See DENNIS C. TANNER, EXPLORING COMMUNICATION DISORDERS: A 21ST CENTURY
INTRODUCTION THROUGH LITERATURE AND MEDIA 121 (2003).
78 Mendota Juvenile Treatment Center (MJTC) in Madison, Wis., includes sessions
in social skills training for delinquent adolescent males. One of the skills taught is
how to ask questions. Interview with Rachel Fregien, SLP at MJTC, in Madison, Wis.
(Dec. 13, 2011). For an explanation of MJTC see LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note
5, at 41–42.
79 Attorney B. See also What’s the Story?, supra note 39, at 248 (explaining that
juveniles rely on well-known “scripts” to cover incompetencies); Stone & Bryan, supra
note 11, at 36 (indicating that defendants attempt to cover incompetencies by nod-
ding frequently, agreeing with counsel, and “talk[ing] a lot but saying very little”).
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the work to be done within it. The good attorney will probe to find
out80 but can usually count on some version of what Attorney F
portrayed as “‘nope I get it,’ [although] the student of human na-
ture knows they don’t.”
B. Narrative Skills
“Effective assistance of counsel is impossible unless the client can provide
his or her lawyer with intelligent and informed input.”81
Even the most crabbed views of assisting counsel and the attor-
ney-client relationship generally concede that a defendant should
be able to communicate about the allegation and his background
with his attorney.82 Often this is couched as the ability to provide
“facts” or recall “events.”83 A slightly more expansive model of at-
torney-client interaction suggests that a defendant should possess
“the ability to provide relevant information about crime events,
personal feelings, and social background when working with coun-
sel to develop a defense.”84 However, as the attorneys we spoke
with made clear, barebones information, facts, and even feelings,
while obviously critical, are far from sufficient. What lawyers need
from their clients are narratives.
Grossly defined, narratives “are stories that adhere to a broad
temporal template so that an account can be provided that follows
a logical, coherent order, taking into consideration the listener’s
presumed prior knowledge.”85 Narratives allow the unfamiliar lis-
tener to make sense of a story that involves persons and situations
the listener knows nothing about.86 However, narratives are not
simply a factual chronological recitation. They are complicated lin-
guistic, cognitive, and psychological structures that require setting
or context, characters, temporal sequence, action, internal and ex-
ternal response, and cause and effect, all of which are moderated
80 See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.2 (3d ed. 1993).
81 United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168, 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
82 See, e.g., Bardwell & Arrigo, supra note 53, at 155. See also Youth (In)justice, supra
note 16, at 4 (“The opportunity to ‘tell one’s story’ to . . . one’s legal counsel . . . is a
basic right in a civilised society.”). But cf. New Jersey v. Miller, 216 N.J. 40, 72 (2013)
(finding that trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied an adjournment
for a defendant who met his newly appointed attorney for the first time for twenty-five
minutes in a stairwell on the morning of trial and was obviously not able to communi-
cate about much of anything). The dissent in Miller noted the majority’s “crabbed
view of constitutionally effective counsel.” Id. at 82 (Albin, J., dissenting).
83 See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
84 Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 3, 16 (1997) [hereinafter Competence of Adolescents].
85 Youth (In)justice, supra note 16, at 2.
86 What’s the Story?, supra note 39, at 247.
2013] “HE GOT IN MY FACE SO I SHOT HIM” 89
by the characteristics of the individual listener.87
These components are exactly why clients’ narratives—or sto-
ries—are so important for lawyers. A defense case is not a law
school exam with a checklist of objectively verifiable facts that can
be matched up with the elements of an offense or an affirmative
defense. More often than not, the defense case is found in the
human factors—the story or stories—that lurk below the surface of
timelines, police reports, and witness statements.
Narrative skills are often weak in individuals with language im-
pairments.88 In fact, poor narratives are frequently the first sign of
previously undiagnosed language deficits in older adolescents and
adults.89 Narrative skills, or the lack of them, have been called “the
canary down the coalmine” of language development,90 and re-
searchers have closely studied their effects.91 As a general matter,
impaired individuals have difficulty relating a story that could be
understood by a listener who does not share the same experience
or knowledge.92 They tend to describe “significantly fewer bits of
information about the context of the story and the events that initi-
ated it.”93 Narratives from linguistically impaired individuals will be
about what happened rather than why.94 Of particular significance
for lawyers is the fact that individuals “who lack adequate story
grammar skills ‘will have difficulty reconstructing their own exper-
iences and sharing them with others.’”95
Narrative difficulties have been identified as a particular
source of difficulty for young men (thirteen to nineteen years old)
involved in the criminal or juvenile justice systems. Studies have
revealed that, when compared with non-offenders of the same age,
or even younger, the offenders’ narratives are noticeably poorer.
Offenders are less able to describe a character’s plan, the cause
87 Id.
88 Young Speakers, supra note 31, at 499.
89 See, e.g., What’s the Story?, supra note 39, at 248–49.
90 Young Speakers, supra note 31, at 499.
91 See, e.g., Elsa Eme et al., Oral Narrative Skills in French Adults Who Are Functionally
Illiterate: Linguistic Features and Discourse Organization, 53 J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE, & HEAR-
ING RES. 1349, 1352–53 (2010).
92 Id. at 1366.
93 Doris Cole, Narrative Development in Aggressive Boys, 26 BEHAV. DISORDERS 332, 339
(2001).
94 See generally Anne McKeough et al., Conceptual Change in Narrative Knowledge: Psy-
chological Understandings of Low-Literacy and Literate Adults, 5 J. NARRATIVE & LIFE HIST.
21 (1995).
95 Young Speakers, supra note 31, at 500 (citing Natalie L. Hedberg and Carol Stoel-
Gammon, Narrative Analysis: Clinical Procedures, 7 TOPICS IN LANGUAGE DISORDERS 58,
68 (1986)).
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and effects of the character’s actions, and the character’s motiva-
tions.96 Researchers have expressed particular concern over how
these young men would have fared when they attempted to tell
their story in the forensic context,  such as during an interrogation
or a conversation with counsel.97
The attorneys we met with were familiar with clients’ narrative
deficits, even if they did not use the term. They knew that they
were missing large segments of many clients’ stories because the
clients simply could not tell them. When asked to elaborate, the
lawyers gave descriptions that bore striking resemblance to the re-
search findings discussed above.
Attorney C remarked that many clients “don’t have narratives”
and lack “the ability to think in narratives.” According to Attorney
B, clients often “can’t tell the story well enough for the attorney to
determine whether there’s a defense.” Attorney I described clients’
narratives as “thin” and offered up an example: “‘He got in my face
so I shot him.’ And they are unable to explain how or why.” Two
attorneys specifically mentioned the lack of “narrative arc” in cli-
ents’ stories. Instead, clients provide their lawyers with a series of
chronologically connected but unexplained or underexplained
events.98 These are the “and then . . . and then . . . and then” types
of narratives typically associated with children.99
The paucity of detail was a particular source of difficulty, espe-
cially detail relating to inner states. In fact, the absence of “emo-
tional content” or “an emotional layer” was specifically raised by a
number of the lawyers. Attorney A observed that many of the
young men she represented had “no emotional vocabulary. They
have two major emotions—pleasure and anger—but anger may
also mean fear.” She suggested that the stock cliche´ “‘Tell us how
you felt?’” was “ridiculous” with these clients.
The impact of clients’ “thin” narratives on the quality of repre-
sentation can be substantial and far-reaching. A client’s narratives
are the raw materials of the case and when they are not available,
96 See What’s the Story?, supra note 39, at 246.; Cole, supra note 93, at 340.
97 What’s the Story?, supra note 39, at 247–48; see also High-Risk Boys, supra note 7, at
17 (describing  the difficulties impaired offenders would have during interrogations).
98 Milwaukee Public Schools (MPS) Special Education Teacher Arthur Gosselin
works with Milwaukee County Jail inmates (who are twenty-one years old or younger)
who are eligible for MPS services and are in jail awaiting trial. His specific focus is
improving “thin narratives” that are common among his students. He helps his stu-
dents build narratives that include character, motivation, and context. Interview with
Arthur Gosselin, Special Education Teacher, MPS (Sept. 2011).
99 See generally What’s the Story?, supra note 39, at 246–47. See also Young Speakers,
supra note 31, at 498.
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the attorney operates from a distinct disadvantage throughout the
representation. Attorney I’s offering of “He got in my face so I shot
him” provides a textbook example.100 On the surface, such a state-
ment may paint a “stereotypical picture of a . . . gangbanger” with a
blase´ disregard for human life.101 But is that what the client is really
saying? What if “got in my face” actually means threatening or as-
saultive behavior? What if the client did in fact feel and taste fear
but lacks the language to describe it? Despite its seemingly callous
exterior, “He got in my face so I shot him” may be the story of self-
defense, and the basis for a finding of mitigation or even justifica-
tion.102 But absent the narrative grist from the client, the lawyer
may not see that possibility or may not be able to make the case in
a credible fashion.103
And the effects will not just be felt at trial. Negotiation will also
suffer. Attorney D, a public defender, rhetorically asked, “How do
you negotiate if the client can’t give you the details of the story?”
Motion practice is likewise affected. Attorney B, an appellate de-
fender, referred to a case where the client was unable to describe
what the police said or did when they interrogated him, which left
voluntariness and Miranda questions unanswerable for trial
counsel.
Ironically, the attorneys we spoke with said very little about the
effects of narrative deficits in what would be the most visible con-
text—a client’s testimony. Perhaps this general silence is because,
as Attorney H concluded, clients with language impairments “can’t
testify.” That conclusion makes unfortunate sense since “the way in
100 Attorney I was the second attorney interviewed. Her example of “He got in my
face so I shot him” was mentioned in subsequent meetings and some of the attorneys
used it as a reference point.
101 United States v. Allen, 603 F.3d 1202, 1210 (10th Cir. 2010).
102 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §3.04(1) (1962) (“Use of Force Justifiable for Pro-
tection of the Person. Subject to the provisions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the
use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that
such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the
use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”). Depending on
the circumstances, “He got in my face so I shot him” may also be the language of
provocation or heat of passion. See id. §210.3(1)(b) (“Manslaughter. Criminal homi-
cide constitutes manslaughter when . . . [it] is committed under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation
or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he
believes them to be.”).
103 Attorney J talked of negotiating a settlement in a homicide case that had a num-
ber of mitigating circumstances that could not adequately be presented at trial, be-
cause the client did not possess “enough language to get to the emotional aspect”
necessary to build the defense.
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which witnesses are allowed to tell their stories in court are ‘very
strange, and are subject to a number of restrictions which do not
exist in other storytelling contexts to anything like the same de-
gree, if at all.’”104 Attorney E mused that even highly educated cli-
ents have trouble telling a story under the “very strange” formats of
direct and cross-examination, subject to the equally strange rules of
evidence. To ask an individual with already limited receptive and
expressive skills to sit in front of a room full of people who will be
judging his credibility by his words, demeanor, and ability to hold
up under an arcane questioning form seems cruelly farcical.105
C. Understanding the Legal Process
“I can explain it to you but I can’t understand it for you.”106
Dusky and its progeny attempt to treat the ability to under-
stand the legal process as a concept that exists independent of the
attorney-client relationship—at least for purposes of competency
to stand trial. In practice however, the two are inseparable. They
are inseparable because the attorney bears responsibility for ensur-
ing that the client does in fact grasp the elements of the offense,
the nature of the defenses, the risks and benefits of a guilty plea
versus a trial, the constitutional rights waived upon a plea of guilty,
and the collateral consequences of any plea.107 Even where the trial
court is the final arbiter of the client’s understanding, the court is
usually dependent on the work of counsel.108
And indeed, no one has ever suggested that circumstances
should be otherwise. As the Supreme Court observed in Padilla v.
Kentucky, “[i]t is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her
client with available advice about an issue[.]”109 Where problems
arise, however, are in those many instances in which an ostensibly
“competent” client lacks the linguistic ability to process and apply
104 Young Speakers, supra note 31, at 499 (citing Diana Eades, Telling and Retelling
Your Story in Court: Questions, Assumptions, and Intercultural Implications, Presen-
tation at the 25th Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration Conference, Mel-
bourne, Austl. (Oct. 14, 2007), available at http://www.aija.org.au/ac07/Papers/
Eades.pdf).
105 See LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 85–87.
106 See “I Can Explain it to You But I Can’t Understand it For You” T-Shirt, ZAZZLE, http:/
/www.zazzle.com/i_can_explain_it_to_you_but_i_cant_understand_tshirt-235130839
083184659 (last visited Dec. 15, 2013) (also attributed to a proverb).
107 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010); Lafler v. Cooper, 132
S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012); Missouri. v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012).
108 See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Remington, supra note 17, at
350–51.
109 Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484.
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even the best advice and the clearest explanation from counsel. In
these instances many of the lawyers we spoke with see judges aban-
doning their obligation to due process and quality control. Attor-
ney H called it “judges tak[ing] cover behind the lawyer.”
It is no secret that legal concepts and the legal process do not
lend themselves to ready explanation. They are abstractions
couched in jargon. Attorney D, commenting on the difficulty of
explaining legal concepts to anybody, including the most capable
clients, suggested that even a concept as routine as “right” is
opaque: “A right—who even knows what that is.” Nevertheless, at-
torneys have an ethical and constitutional obligation to translate
not only the jargon, but the concepts behind it, and very often, the
process itself.110
But the fact that a lawyer may have translated or explained the
legal process is hardly the end of the inquiry. Translation is effec-
tive only when it is understood, and comprehension, especially in
the legal context, takes a large quiver of sophisticated linguistic
tools. First, the listener must have the receptive skills, including
vocabulary and the ability to decipher a series of sentences, many
of which will be complex or at least compound. The listener must
also possess a fund of knowledge upon which to build his under-
standing of the new information. Similarly, the listener needs the
knowledge base, in combination with the appropriate pragmatic
skill, to grasp the inferences in the speaker’s language—i.e. the lis-
tener must be able to read between the lines. Physiologically, the
listener must possess sufficient auditory processing capacity to en-
able him to make auditory sense of what the lawyer is saying. Fi-
nally, the listener must have auditory memory so that he can
remember what he is told and incorporate it into his decision-
making.111
All the lawyers we spoke with recognized that many of their
clients lacked some or all of the skills to allow them to adequately
comprehend and work with the plethora of information that ac-
companies even a misdemeanor. Attorney B estimated that when
dealing with adolescents and young adults, the number could be as
110 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.8(b) (3d ed. 1993)
(“Defense counsel should explain developments in the case to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.”).
111 See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youth’s Capacity as Trial Defendants,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 139, 146–50
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) [hereinafter What We Know]; Restor-
ative Justice Conferencing, supra note 34, at 329–30.
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high as 75%. The attorneys were also quite adamant about their
own profession’s lack of qualification and skill to address the
problem.112
The lawyers were noticeably exasperated and at times angry
about their clients’ inability to understand legal information. This
was the area where they could most readily recognize the implica-
tions of language impairment and could see the failure of the legal
system to acknowledge the problem. The frustration was with both
the competency process and the prevailing attitude that the lawyer
can fix whatever deficits the client may have by “carefully explain-
ing” the process.113 “The client has one, two, three deficiencies and
rudimentary language, but if the lawyer explains then the client is
‘competent.’”114  This so-called solution essentially says that “if you
have the perfect lawyer, then you are competent.”115 This ap-
proach, which has been called “facilitating competency,” often asks
the lawyer to do the impossible.116
At the same time, courts seem to turn a blind eye to the opac-
ity of the entire legal process. Words and procedures that are care-
fully crafted by appellate courts, and which might make sense to
the legally trained, have no substantive meaning to the individual
whose spoken language comprehension is in the bottom tenth per-
centile of the entire population. Yet we continue to insist that such
individuals can be made to understand.
Though it has no technical bearing on the attorney-client rela-
tionship, three of the lawyers offered Miranda as an iconic example
of the opaque form-over-substance ritual that pervades so much of
the criminal and juvenile justice systems; and of the systems’ will-
ingness to suspend disbelief in order to find that undereducated,
linguistically deficient individuals have sufficient comprehen-
sion.117 Attorney A openly mocked the notion that Miranda warn-
112 Commentators have suggested that lawyers are not particularly skilled at trans-
lating or explaining legal concepts to anyone, impaired or otherwise. See ELIZABETH
MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 99
(2007); THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
COMPETENCE 117 (Bruce Dennis Sales ed., 1st ed. 1981).
113 Cf. e.g., Competence of Adolescents, supra note 84, at 23–25.
114 Attorney I.
115 Attorney E.
116 Emily Buss, The Role of Lawyers in Promoting Juveniles’ Competence as Defendants, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 243, 253–62
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
117 Psychologist Richard Rogers has studied the Miranda warnings extensively and
has found them widely incomprehensible, despite a general assumption that “every-
one knows their Miranda rights.” Richard Rogers et al., “Everyone Knows Their Miranda
Rights”: Implicit Assumptions and Countervailing Evidence, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
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ings, however much they are a part of the national culture, convey
constitutional rights to verbally deficient young men: “Oh yes,
they’ve seen [the Miranda warnings] on TV and they know what it
means—it means you are going to jail. It’s a mantra. It doesn’t say,
‘This is your lucky day; this is the day you get to assert your full
rights as a citizen.’”118
The lawyers were perplexed that trial judges in particular (at
least some of whom had been criminal defense lawyers earlier in
their careers) seemed to have no idea how difficult communicating
with clients could be. Attorney D quipped that judges seem to
think “you just have to say it slower and louder.”119 He reported
that judges also place great stock in the power of repetition, but
this too is no solution: “It’s the evanescent nature of understanding
[with clients]. You explain it and in that moment it’s OK. But a half
an hour later, no. So you explain it again. And again.”120
Research confirms the lawyers’ impressions about their clients’
poor comprehension and the lack of an easy fix. Simply repeating
and explaining, even in plain English, does not necessarily work.121
300, 301–02 (2010). Rogers et al. tested 119 college students on their understanding
of the Miranda warnings and found that barely one third had an “accurate working
knowledge of their rights.” Id. at 305, 314. Meanwhile, courts continue to find know-
ing and voluntary waivers in cases where the defendants’ IQ is low enough to place
them in the “retarded” category. See, e.g., Otis v. State, 217 S.W.3d 839, 845–46 (Ark.
2005) (explaining that a fourteen-year-old defendant with an IQ of 68–69 validly
waived Miranda rights); Bevel v. State, 983 So. 2d 505, 515–16 (Fla. 2008) (demon-
strating that a defendant with an IQ of 65 validly waived Miranda rights); In re MAC,
761 A.2d 32, 34, 38–39 (D.C. 2000) (showing that a fifteen-year-old defendant who
was mildly mentally retarded validly waived Miranda rights).
118 Comprehension of Miranda warnings is made all the more difficult because they
do not mean what they say. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203–05 (1989)
(indicating that despite pre-interrogation language that says “you have the right to an
attorney and if you cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed,” defendants
have the right to appointed counsel only if and when they go to court; otherwise, they
have the right to pay for counsel prior to their proceeding); Berghuis v. Thompkins,
130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259–60 (2010) (explaining that in order to invoke his right to re-
main silent, a defendant must specifically state that intention; silence does not suf-
fice). Attorney Michael Cicchini, a frequent contributor to the Marquette University
Law School Faculty Blog, has posited that a “new and improved” Miranda would be-
gin, “Actually, you really don’t have the right to remain silent, unless you first speak,”
and would continue in that vein. Michael Cicchini, The New Miranda Warning, MARQ.
U. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2010), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2010/
11/08/the-new-miranda-warning. Of course, even the improved model would be diffi-
cult for an individual with auditory processing and memory deficits.
119 Attorney C was more irreverent: “Repeating to a person who can’t understand
what you are talking about is like speaking loud to a deaf person.”
120 This fleeting understanding is typical of individuals with auditory memory
deficits.
121 See Barbara Kaban & Judith Quinlan, Rethinking a “Knowing, Intelligent, and Vol-
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And contrary to the prevailing wisdom, prior experience with the
juvenile or criminal justice systems does not necessarily improve an
individual’s comprehension of the process.122
A defendant’s youth is a widely known and widely accepted
impediment to comprehension of legal information.123 But it turns
out that poor language skills can interfere with the ability to under-
stand legal information as much as youth, and in certain instances,
even more. Research on language impairments in correctional in-
stitutions has shown in that a significant percentage of older ado-
lescent and adult inmates have language deficits that leave them
with listening and comprehension levels below those of an average
eleven-year-old.124 These difficulties are especially likely to affect
“the ability to ‘decode’ abstract language,” a category which cer-
tainly includes most legal terminology.125
All of the lawyers were asked about the types of legal informa-
tion that cause the most difficulties, even after explanation. Notice-
ably absent from their responses were the civics catechism—e.g.,
“Who is the judge?” “What does your lawyer do?”—that often in-
forms competency decisions and competency training.126 Rather,
the lawyers talked about ingredients essential to knowledgeable
and rational decision-making: the real-life meaning of charges and
defenses (as opposed to a recitation of statutory language),127 the
untary Waiver” in Massachusetts’ Juvenile Courts, 5 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS.
35, 45–49 (2004).
122 What We Know, supra note 111, at 151. An interesting aspect of this line of re-
search is that, while its focus is juveniles (under eighteen) and whether juveniles “age
in” to comprehension of legal information, the incidental findings about the compar-
ison group of adult subjects clearly demonstrate that many individuals experience
substantial impediments to comprehension well beyond age eighteen. See, e.g., Jen-
nifer L. Woolard et al., Examining Adolescents’ and Their Parents’ Conceptual and Practical
Knowledge of Police Interrogation: A Family Dyad Approach, 37 J. YOUTH ADOLESCENCE 685,
694–97 (2008).
123 See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV 1134, 1160–66 (1980); What We Know, supra note 111, at
146–53.
124 Bryan, Freer & Furlong, supra note 11, at 507; Preliminary Study, supra note 20, at
396. Note: the studies all controlled for performance or non-verbal IQ. Pamela C.
Snow & Martine B. Powell, Developmental Language Disorders and Adolescent Risk: A Pub-
lic-Health Advocacy Role for Speech Pathologists?, 6 INT’L J. SPEECH-LANGUAGE PATHOLOGY
221, 226 (2004) [hereinafter Developmental Language Disorders] (offenders with LI per-
formed “significantly more poorly [on language measures] than a group of demo-
graphically similar youths who were 2 years younger.”).
125 Developmental Language Disorders, supra note 124, at 226.
126 See, e.g., United States v. Duhon, 104 F. Supp. 2d 663, 666, 673–74 (W.D. La.
2000).
127 Attorney A believes that “a defendant’s ability to articulate statutory defenses is a
piss-poor way to determine ability to understand.”
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significance of a guilty plea, potential penalties, other direct and
collateral consequences of a conviction, risks and benefits of a trial,
and how a trial actually operates.
D. Decision-Making
In any criminal or delinquency case, the client must make all
decisions regarding the “objectives of the representation.”128 The
ultimate decision is, of course, the decision whether to plead guilty
(generally in connection with a plea offer) or to go to trial.
Informed and rational decision-making is a complicated pro-
cess that depends on a well-developed skill set. Decision-making at
the level required of juvenile and criminal defendants involves:
1) comprehending and communicating choices; 2) understanding
relevant information; 3) appreciating the situation and its conse-
quences; and 4) manipulating information rationally.129 When de-
cision-making is viewed in this light, it is easy to see the central role
of expressive, receptive, and pragmatic language skills. It is also
easy to see why the attorneys we spoke to were skeptical about
many of their clients’ decision-making capacities.
As we might expect, the attorneys took client decision-making
very seriously and repeatedly mentioned the chasm between cli-
ents’ capacities and the life-altering types of decisions they are ex-
pected to make. Lawyers are often taken to task for questioning the
rationality of a client’s decision-making because the client does not
agree with them,130 but the lawyers we interviewed were very much
in touch with the meaning of “rational decision making.”131 They
also believed that courts and forensic specialists grossly underesti-
mate the complexities of client decision-making in the criminal
and juvenile justice arenas. Attorney C expressed the disconnect
this way: “To say they have decision-making capability because they
128 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2012).
129 Paul S. Applebaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients’ Capacities to Consent to
Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED, 1635, 1635–36 (1988). As discussed in Applebaum &
Grisso’s article, these four categories define legal standards for a patient’s compe-
tency to consent to medical treatment. However, this model applies equally to deci-
sion-making in the legal context. See, e.g., Competence of Adolescents, supra note 84, at
8–9; What We Know, supra note 111, at 157–62.
130 See, e.g., Kristin Henning, Denial of the Child’s Right to Counsel, Voice, and Participa-
tion in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 89 CHILD WELFARE 121, 131 (2010).
131 The lawyers tended to have a holistic view of decision-making. See Maroney,
supra note 53, at 1400–08; but cf. Poythress et al., supra note 51, at 451 (showing that
lawyers were more likely to express doubts about their clients’ competence when cli-
ents rejected their lawyers’ advice).
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can repeat back is the same as saying that a child who knows that a
red ball is not blue understands the truth.”
As a threshold matter, Attorney B saw insurmountable
problems with “the things we ask [clients] to decide. We ask them
to answer such hard questions.” She described how just the con-
cept of a long versus a longer sentence can be difficult for a defen-
dant to grasp.132 And on top of those years of incarceration, clients
are “bombed with consequences.” Attorney B gave the example of a
nineteen-year-old charged with having sexual intercourse with his
fifteen-year-old girlfriend: “Do you want to claim third degree [sex-
ual assault] which means no exemption from the [sex offender]
registry or do you want to stick with second degree [sexual assault],
which means you might be able to get exempt from the registry, or
maybe not. But then you might be facing a [sexually violent per-
sons commitment].” It boggles the mind to think of the level of
linguistic processing that it takes to make sense of such a
proposition.
Attorneys also voiced strong doubts about many clients’ ability
to weigh the strength of their case and the risks of taking a case to
trial. First, many clients lack complete factual information when
they make their decisions. While they may know something about
good facts and bad facts, clients do not have the same information
as the professionals in the system. Attorney A compared a lawyer’s
assessment of a case with that of a typical client: attorneys, unlike
clients, have a broad fund of knowledge about “[other] cases, the
judge and the judge’s reputation, and witnesses,” along with court-
house culture and prevailing trends. Adding to the clients’ disad-
vantage is the fact that “we [lawyers] rarely state the universe of
information.” And even if lawyers did state that universe of infor-
mation, clients with linguistic shortcomings could not begin to pro-
cess and comprehend such a complex universe.
The other missing piece for many clients is the pragmatic lan-
guage skill known as theory of mind, which has been called “the
basis for human interaction as it underpins our ability to under-
stand, predict, and interpret the thoughts and feelings of others in
132 Attorney K noted that written plea agreements in federal cases are even more
difficult to understand since they deal with a guideline range that is stated in terms of
months rather than years. Numeracy is a cognitive task that influences decision-mak-
ing. Fabio Del Missier et al., Decision-making Competence, Executive Functioning, and Gen-
eral Cognitive Abilities, 25 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 331, 333 (2012). Numeracy is also
one of the functions that is negatively affected by language disorder. See Preliminary
Study, supra note 20, at 392.
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our world.”133 Theory of mind is thought to be acquired “through
the acquisition of social and linguistic competencies” and is the
means by which one person can take the perspective of another.134
Theory of mind and perspective-taking are as critical to client deci-
sion-making as legal and factual information because, as Attorney
E reminds us, the legal system is ultimately “humans making deci-
sions about you.” In functional terms, this means that a client
“need[s] to know how others perceive the case . . . to assess
whether an offer is good” or to realize “how the state could prove
you guilty. [A client must be able] to have a conversation about
alternatives . . . to look at a case technically and in the audience’s
perspective.”135
All of the lawyers reported that they regularly see clients with
an underdeveloped ability to take the perspective of their audi-
ence. The attorneys’ observations match extensive research that
has found poor theory of mind and perspective-taking among indi-
viduals likely to be in the criminal justice system.136 Attorney F said
that the “common thread” for so many clients is “no ability to grasp
the other person, . . . no ability to understand someone else.” At-
torney I described clients who “don’t know what other people
think.” Attorney G concurred, noting the many clients who “do not
understand what people are motivated by or what other people
believe.”
The attorneys felt that as a result of their clients’ lack of com-
plete information and their comprehension deficits, including de-
ficiencies in theory of mind and perspective-taking, many of them
made decisions with a deeply flawed understanding of the case
against them and of the risks they faced, particularly the risks of
going to trial. These decisions can have stark consequences since
133 Young Speakers, supra note 31, at 499 (citing Janet Wilde Astington & Terri Bar-
riault, Children’s Theory of Mind: How Young Children Come to Understand that People Have
Thoughts and Feelings, 13 INFANTS & YOUNG CHILD, 1, 2 (2001)).
134 Young Speakers, supra note 31, at 500 (citing Jay L. Garfield, Candida C. Peterson
& Tricia Perry, Social Cognition, Language Acquisition and the Development of the Theory of
Mind, 16 MIND & LANGUAGE 494, 496 (2001)).
135 Attorney H.
136 A substantial body of research correlates language deficits, behavior problems,
and poor theory of mind. See, e.g., Francesca Happe´ & Uta Frith, Theory of Mind and
Social Impairment in Children with Conduct Disorder, 14 BRIT. J. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
385 (1996); Young Speakers, supra note 31, at 497–98 (probable theory of mind deficits
among victims of childhood maltreatment); Dante Ciccheti et al., False Belief Under-
standing in Maltreated Children, 15 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1067, 1086–87 (2003);
Katherine C. Pears & Philip A. Fisher, Emotion Understanding and Theory of Mind Among
Maltreated Children in Foster Care: Evidence of Deficits, 17 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 47,
49–50, 60–61 (2005); Dionne, supra note 35, at 333, 346–47.
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“the trial penalty is very real.”137 Attorney G probably spoke for at-
torneys everywhere when he called clients’ inability to appreciate
the risks of their decisions “the most frustrating part” of his repre-
sentation, especially since, in the end, it is the attorney’s role to
facilitate those decisions.138
E. Empathy, Trust, and Pragmatics
The success of an attorney-client relationship is as dependent
on intangibles like empathy (a lawyer’s for her client) and trust (a
client’s of his lawyer) as it is on substantive aspects like narrative
ability and comprehension of legal information. Unfortunately,
these intangibles are highly susceptible to a client’s communica-
tion deficits. The problem arises because both trust and empathy
are built on a foundation of communication and mutual under-
standing; when that foundation is flawed, trust and empathy—and
thus the attorney-client relationship itself—may not develop prop-
erly, or even at all.139
Once again pragmatics is an important factor. Pragmatic defi-
cits, as discussed earlier, are manifested by an inability to read so-
cial situations and social cues, to comprehend the perspective of
others, and to conform to the rules of social engagement, making
the person appear “uncooperative at the least, or more seriously,
rude or insulting.”140 Meanwhile, in keeping with the theory of
pragmatics, the “other variable in the equation”—i.e., the lawyer—
can be expected to react.141 The attorney-client relationship after
all is “a two-way street; it is one of give and take. It is not the lawyer
reciting constitutional rights.”142
This can easily lead to a downward spiral in which the client
then responds poorly to the lawyer, who reacts to the client, and so
on. Such a chain reaction is virtually guaranteed to destroy empa-
thy and trust, and can take a genuine toll on the quality of the
137 Attorney F. See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363–65 (1978).
138 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RS. 1.2(a), 1.4(b).
139 For example, the first-known empirical study of attorney-client trust found that
trust was more likely to occur where the defendant had sufficient knowledge of the
process and of the role of defense counsel. Boccaccini & Brodsky, supra note 66, at 71
(citing Christine Schnyder Pierce & Stanley Brodsky, Trust and Understanding in the
Attorney-Juvenile Relationship, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 89 (2002)).
140 LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 58; see also Kathleen Bardovi-Harlig et
al., Developing Awareness: Closing the Conversation, in POWER, PEDAGOGY, AND PRACTICE
324 (Tricia Hedge & Norman Whitney eds., 1996).
141 Attorney I.
142 Attorney C.
2013] “HE GOT IN MY FACE SO I SHOT HIM” 101
relationship, and the quality of a lawyer’s legal work.143 Attorney K
believed that a lawyer’s negative reaction to a client’s inappropriate
comments or behavior “can easily create bias, which will affect not
only how the attorney perceives the client but the client’s case.”
And of course we cannot simply command a lawyer to feel empathy
for her client any more than we command a client to trust his law-
yer. As Attorney F told us, “‘Trust me’ is stupid.”
All of the relational difficulties presented by the clients with
language disorders are exacerbated in the context of indigent de-
fense.144 Whether the attorney is an institutional defender, ap-
pointed counsel, or a contract defender, time and resources are in
short supply. Meanwhile, establishing an acceptable working rela-
tionship with a linguistically deficient client takes extra time. In
addition, communicating with this person will take skill and, in
many cases, special knowledge and assistance, neither of which is
available in standard defender offices.145
As a result, the needs of the linguistically impaired client can
easily come into direct conflict with the attorney who has too many
cases, is overscheduled, and lacks the necessary internal and exter-
nal resources to adequately cope.146 Consequently, the relationship
will suffer. Attorney F believed that pragmatic deficits would be
particularly toxic for the lawyer with an excessive caseload. With
the client who is personally difficult and unrealistic in his or her
demands, the lawyer’s lack of time and patience could easily play
itself out as “‘[expletive] you, make your own mistakes.’”147
But even with a “polite” client, high caseloads and court-im-
posed time pressures will amplify the effects of communication def-
icits on the attorney-client relationship.148 Attorney G, a part-time
143 Trust is cultivated when the attorney is receptive to the input of the client. Boc-
caccini & Brodsky, supra note 66, at 82.
144 For example, in one study, “[l]ow-attorney trust was associated with having a
court-appointed attorney.” Boccaccini & Brodsky, supra note 66, at 82.
145 Attorneys H and J, who are both training directors in statewide public defender
systems, noted the lack of special assistance or training. Attorney J complained that
“lawyers aren’t trained and law schools aren’t training students [to work with linguisti-
cally impaired clients]. And where is the support for lawyers with these clients?”
146 See, e.g., Heather Baxter, Too Many Clients, Too Little Time: How States Are Forcing
Public Defenders to Violate Their Ethical Obligations, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 91, 91–92 (2012).
147 During co-author Michele LaVigne’s conversations with the attorneys, they
freely used language that might be considered vulgar or profane in another profes-
sional context. This was to be expected, since  LaVigne is a former public defender
and thus a member of the “closed subculture” of defense attorneys. See Dean A.
Strang, Becoming What We Pretend to Be: Signs of Values in the Casual Rhetoric of American
Criminal Justice, 24 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 313, 321, 329 (2009).
148 Attorneys A and B both expressed concerns about the “polite” client. Attorney B
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contract defender with a high felony caseload in an urban court
system, was matter-of-fact about the grim realities of his practice:
Court “starts at noon . . . . Things need to keep plugging and chug-
ging. . . . With some clients who don’t really get it, I have to say ‘I
can’t sit here any longer.’ In a perfect world we would do that of
course, but I can’t. Do you ever have enough time?”149
V. GETTING BEYOND “HE GOT IN MY FACE SO I SHOT HIM”
A. For Lawyers
In a perfect world, every attorney would have ready access to
the services of an SLP who could assess clients’ communicative abil-
ities and facilitate communication with any client. Of course, the
world of indigent defense is far from perfect, and access to an SLP
for even a small percentage of impaired clients is wishful thinking.
This means that counsel will be forced to address clients with lan-
guage impairments on a case-by-case basis and to develop an assort-
ment of strategies for dealing with communication issues.
At the most extreme end will be the cases where the impair-
ment interferes with the right to counsel at a fundamental constitu-
tional level. Generally these cases will involve clients with severe
language impairments that co-occur with other disabilities.150 In
those cases counsel should aggressively pursue the issue of compe-
tency and seek a court-ordered evaluation that includes a language
assessment. A forensic evaluation that includes an evidence-based
“second-generation adjudicative competency measure,”151 such as
the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Criminal Adjudica-
believes that judges conflate polite with intelligent. She gave a case example where
the trial court said that the “polite” defendant was “highly intelligent,” but he had an
IQ of 80. Attorney A said that “we confuse malleability with competence” and that
judges overestimate the “kids who are well-behaved, looking intently, nodding.”
149 Attorney G works half time as an associate in a law firm and half time as a con-
tract defender. In his defender position, he is required to provide representation in
100 major felony cases, including child sexual assaults and non-capital homicides. At
the time of the interview (Nov. 2011), he was paid $250 per case. The National Legal
Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) Standards for the Defense recommend a
caseload of no more than 150 felonies per year for a full-time defender. STANDARDS
FOR THE DEFENSE §§ 13.7, 13.12 (1973). NLADA also recommends that complex cases
be given more “case points,” thereby reducing the number of felonies handled per
year well below 150. NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, AM. COUNSEL OF CHIEF DE-
FENDERS, STATEMENT ON CASELOADS AND WORKLOADS 4–5 (2007), available at http://
www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1189179200.71/.
150 See LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 42.
151 GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HAND-
BOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 149–55 (3d ed. 2007).
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tion (MAC-CAT-CA)152 or the Evaluation of Competency to Stand
Trial – Revised (ECST-R),153 combined with a specialized language
assessment by an SLP,154 provides the best chance for accurate,
reliable information about an individual’s actual abilities to con-
sult with counsel, comprehend information, and make rational
decisions.155
Experience tells us, though, that clients with even severe lan-
guage impairments can be found competent, especially in jurisdic-
tions where courts and forensic examiners continue to rely on
“crude method[s] of assessing [competency].”156 What then?
Counsel will still be facing communication deficits that make effec-
tive assistance a stretch, yet will be required to compensate. A re-
sponsible accommodation would be to hire an SLP as a consultant.
SLPs are trained to work with areas “such as listening, understand-
ing, vocabulary, narrative skills, speech production, fluency man-
agement, language skills, non verbal communication, appropriate
assertive communication, social communication, and [even] inter-
view[ing] and court preparation.”157 An SLP would be able to
assess a client’s communication levels, advise the attorney on her
own communication methods to ensure maximum comprehen-
sion, and help the client provide a complete, meaningful
narrative.158
152 NORMAN G. POYTHRESS ET AL., THE MACARTHUR COMPETENCE ASSESSMENT TOOL-
CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION: PROFESSIONAL MANUAL 6 (1999).
153 RICHARD ROGERS ET AL., EVALUATION OF COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL – REVISED:
PROFESSIONAL MANUAL (2004).
154 For a description of standardized and non-standardized approaches for assess-
ing communicative ability, see Vicki A. Reed, Adolescents with Language Impairment, in
AN INTRODUCTION TO CHILDREN WITH LANGUAGE DISORDERS 168, 201–09 (3rd ed.
2005). We also recommend that counsel contact the examining psychologist to dis-
cuss the communication difficulties presented by the particular client.
155 “Specialized tests of language functioning [used in conjunction with compe-
tency instruments] . . . often give a meaningful representation of what a defendant
will actually hear or process, and what he or she will be able to communicate within
the complexities of a real-time courtroom.” Mark Siegert & Kenneth J. Weiss, Who Is
an Expert? Competency Evaluations in Mental Retardation and Borderline Intelligence, 35 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 346, 349 (2007). Even if the evaluating psychologist is not
persuaded by the results of the language assessment, this information can be impor-
tant fodder for cross-examination and the basis for arguing that the court should look
beyond the psychologist’s opinion.
156 Attorney H, who expressed serious doubts about the way competency is assessed
in her state, used this phrase. Attorney F referred to these types of evaluations as
“drive-bys.” Attorney B said that while competency assessments were improving for
juveniles, they were still rudimentary for adults. Thus, in her experience, the issue was
rarely raised in adult cases.
157 Gregory & Bryan, supra note 8, at 207.
158 See, e.g., Stone & Bryan, supra note 11, at 35–36. An SLP would also be an invalu-
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The SLP may also serve as an intermediary or “cognitive inter-
preter.”159 This recommendation borrows from a model developed
in Great Britain under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence
Act 1999 for witnesses with learning disabilities.160 The purpose of
the act was to “improve the quality of a witness’s evidence in terms
of completeness, coherence and accuracy.”161 Under the 1999 law,
the intermediary helps the witness to understand the questions put
to them by law enforcement or in court, and enables the court or
police to understand the responses.162 In the attorney-client con-
text, the intermediary would have a similar function. He or she
could rephrase questions and comments from counsel and could
actively participate in teasing out the client’s narrative.163 When
used in this fashion, the SLP has the same constitutional underpin-
nings as an interpreter.164 The SLP/intermediary, just like an inter-
preter, may be necessary to ensure linguistically impaired
defendants a meaningful right to counsel and justice.165
And then there are the rest of the cases—the many cases in
which the client is “competent” (though it is probably more accu-
rate to say “not incompetent”) but impaired, and limited resources
do not allow for an assessment, consultant, or intermediary. In
these cases, counsel may feel that she is expected to handle yet
another dilemma—for which she is not qualified—on her own.
Luckily, speech-language experts who specialize in the forensic as-
able asset in helping counsel determine whether competency is an ongoing issue,
whether a client’s statements to police were voluntarily made, and whether the client
made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of Miranda. Given the prevalence
of language impairments among defendant populations, an in-house SLP would be a
sound investment, at least in larger defender offices.
159 Pamela Cooke & Graham Davies, Achieving Best Evidence from Witnesses with Learn-
ing Disabilities: New Guidance, 29 BRIT. J. LEARNING DISABILITIES 84, 85 (2001). North-
ern Ireland has begun using SLPs as intermediaries for defendants as well. Email from
Alison McCullough, Northern Ireland Country Officer, Royal College of Speech &
Language Therapists, Belfast, N. Ir. (Aug. 30, 2013) (on file with co-author Michele
LaVigne).
160 Cooke & Davies, supra note 159, at 84.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 85.
163 In these cases, we envision that an SLP would function more as a deaf relay
interpreter, used with a deaf client with limited language. See LaVigne & Vernon,
supra note 28, at 880, 926.
164 Most courts have refused to find a per se constitutional right to an interpreter.
Rather, the right is derivative as a means of ensuring the right to counsel. See, e.g.,
United States v. Mosquera, 816 F. Supp. 168, 172–73 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
165 See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR LANGUAGE ACCESS IN COURTS 19–25 (2012),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid
_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_standards_for_language_access_proposal.authcheck
dam.pdf.
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pects of language impairments have anticipated that lawyers and
other legal professionals will often be forced to address the needs
of linguistically deficient clients without the aid of a live speech-
language professional, and have articulated techniques for address-
ing some of the issues.166
The first task is to recognize a potential language disorder,
bearing in mind that for many clients, the impairment will often
not have been identified. There are well-established signs of lan-
guage impairments that will be familiar to any experienced defense
attorney.167 These include: forgetting instructions; confusion when
confronted with non-literal language such as idioms, metaphors, or
sarcasm; talking a lot but saying little; difficulty asking questions;
and a tendency to stray from the topic.168 Narrative deficits may
reveal themselves when the client “is required to respond to an
unfamiliar topic or formulate answers to specific questions in ex-
tended discourse, especially when the answers are expected to be
complete and fully explained.”169
Where counsel suspects language and communication deficits,
the initial step for the attorney is to not assume that the client is
being difficult, although it may certainly appear that way, especially
if the client is trying to hide his or her deficits.170 In order to maxi-
mize the client’s comprehension, speech-language experts recom-
mend that the attorney provide information in small chunks and
make use of visuals such as gesture, role-play, and drawings.171 At-
torneys are also encouraged to pay attention to the non-verbal sig-
nals that they themselves are giving.172 Individuals with language
impairments, many of whom have gone through life labeled as
“failures,” can be sensitive to facial expressions that show frustra-
tion or ridicule.173
Professionals have similarly developed techniques for improv-
ing clients’ narratives. Sally Miles, a speech pathologist with a spe-
cial interest in narrative deficits, describes the attorney seeking a
narrative as “an archaeologist looking for shards.”174 As this vivid
analogy suggests, attorneys should not expect the client’s narrative
166 Stone & Bryan, supra note 11, at 36.
167 Id.; see also LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 101–02.
168 Id.
169 What’s the Story?, supra note 39, at 247.
170 Stone & Bryan, supra note 11, at 36.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Interview with Sally Miles, Ph.D., CCC-SLP, in Madison, Wis. (Apr. 18, 2012).
174 Id.
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to be delivered intact; rather, it will come in pieces and will emerge
over time. Attorneys should be willing to revisit the narrative and to
employ techniques such as role-playing and visuals. Where details
are missing, the attorney should focus the client’s attention to
those areas and enlist the client’s assistance in helping the attorney
understand. This will often involve a combination of open-ended
questions (“Tell me more about that.”) with closed-ended directive
questions (“When you say ‘he got in your face,’ show me exactly
what he did.”).175
The lawyers we spoke with had their own ideas for improving
the quality of communication. Narratives were of special concern,
given their central role in the building of a defense. Attorney B
likes to tell a client to “pretend that this is a movie,” and asks for
descriptions of what is on the screen.176 She also tries to “walk [the
client] back far enough” in order to develop context that might be
missing from the client’s original telling. Attorney A believes she
can extract a meaningful narrative only if she and the client have a
“long, slow conversation” geared primarily toward “uncovering the
emotional content.”177 Attorney F uses a more formalized ap-
proach, putting the incident “into action” via the psychodrama
technique taught at Gerry Spence’s Trial Lawyer’s College.178
When confronted with a thin narrative like “He got in my face so I
shot him,” he will work with the client and shift the tense and per-
son of the telling: “Dude shows up—what’s he wearing? Become
dude for me. Tell me what dude is thinking.” If the client says some
version of “I don’t know,” Attorney F will persist: “You can’t give
me that. What do you think dude is thinking? What’s your guess?”
Attorney F then asks the client to act out both roles. “You grab your
gun. You have a little voice in your head. What’s it saying?” Attor-
175 Interview with Sally Miles, supra note 173. These are the same types of tech-
niques found in programs designed to improve the narrative skills and overall com-
munication abilities of adolescents and young adults in correctional institutions. See,
e.g., Gregory & Bryan, supra note 8, at 207 (intervention plans for youthful offenders
include narrative skills). Special education teacher Arthur Gosselin uses a template
with visual prompts to help inmates develop narratives that reflect more than just a
time line. Interview with Arthur Gosselin, supra note 98.
176 In contrast, Attorney J said she did not like the movie technique. However, At-
torney J did agree with Dr. Miles’ notion of “get[ting] the story in small pieces.”
177 Attorney D also emphasized the importance of eliciting “the emotional layer.”
Attorney A believed that “if you don’t know how to uncover the emotional content,
then the kid is incompetent.”
178 See generally Dana K. Cole, Psychodrama and the Training of Trial Lawyers: Finding
the Story, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1 (2001). Attorney F is a faculty member at the Trial
Lawyer’s College.
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ney F believes that through this technique “a less verbal person can
maybe get there, or can come close.”
Making legal information comprehensible was the other obsta-
cle the attorneys wrestled with. Attorney I suggested that attorneys
develop “an array of ways of explaining” the myriad legal concepts,
rules, and consequences. She saw this becoming all the more criti-
cal as the legal system moves toward increased reliance on densely
worded forms and continues to impose “lists of rules that get
longer.” Attorney A recognized that “the language of informing
the accused is difficult” whether in the police station or the law-
yer’s office, and described the job of the lawyer as “unpacking [the
language and concepts] every step of the way.” That means that
attorneys cannot simply assume that “everybody knows that,” but
must start further back in explanations and should break free from
legal language.179 Attorney A also offered some very practical tips
that she has picked up along the way in her extensive career:
Have the client describe non-criminal events in order to get a
sense of his speech patterns and thought processes. This will
give you a sense of the kind of language that may work with
him.180 And find out how the client covers “I don’t understand.”
He may give a seemingly sophisticated response even though he
doesn’t get it.
Of course, we should not overlook the importance of training.
As three of the lawyers told us, attorneys are not trained to either
recognize or address language and communication deficits, despite
the fact that they confront them regularly. The attorneys who dis-
cussed training were adamant that law school and continuing legal
education programs need to incorporate communication with a
range of clients, including those with limited language skills.
Finally, we would be remiss if we did not discuss the elephant
in the room for all lawyers: time. There is no doubt that a meaning-
ful, custom-designed conversation with a linguistically deficient cli-
ent can take more time than a standard, checklist-type interview.
But the attorneys who talked about this issue also believed that the
extra time is worth it, paying dividends in important details, a
deeper narrative, and enhanced comprehension by the client.
Speech-language professionals concur, maintaining that because of
the improved communication, taking the extra time and effort will
179 LaVigne & Vernon, supra note 28, at 862–64 (knowledge deprivation is an effect
of language deprivation); see also LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 103–05.
180 Attorney A’s suggestion is similar to a recommendation made by noted SLPs
Kathryn Stone and Karen Bryan. Stone & Bryan, supra note 11, at 36 (“[O]bserve what
helps.”).
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often be more efficient and may, in the end, even save time.181
Moreover, as counsel becomes more familiar with techniques for
recognizing and addressing language impairments, many inter-
views will become less of a struggle.
B. Not Just for Lawyers
Although the quality of communication within the attorney-
client relationship rests primarily with the individual lawyer, we
cannot overlook the fact that attorneys operate within a larger sys-
tem, and too often that system is at odds with effective representa-
tion, especially for the client with special needs. The main problem
is that all segments of the legal system place a premium on speed
and numbers, and too often adequate communication, effective as-
sistance of counsel, and due process are far down the priority
list.182 More than one commentator has likened the criminal jus-
tice system “to fast-food restaurants.”183 Attorney D described it as
“a system built on ‘got to run these clients through.’”
Excessive attorney caseloads are of course a major contributor
to poor attorney-client communication. The staggering number of
cases shouldered by many public defenders and contract defenders
often make it impossible to communicate in more than a perfunc-
tory way.184 And lack of resources for expert assistance only makes
the situation worse.
But courts and prosecutors exert their own pressures that compro-
mise the quality of communication. Attorney K offered the ex-
treme example of a homicide case where, because of a scheduling
conflict, he had not had the opportunity to discuss the presentence
investigation with his client prior to the sentencing hearing. Rather
than grant a continuance, the trial judge gave Attorney K “one
hour to read the PSI [presentence investigation] in the bullpen185
to [the] client before sentencing.” To which Attorney K could only
181 Stone & Bryan, supra note 11, at 36.
182 See generally Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resis-
tance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150 (2013) (describing the effects of
inadequate funding and high volume on the quality of defense services).
183 Id. at 2172.
184 In some defender offices, caseloads are so high that the average amount of time
spent per case is measured in minutes. Hannah Levintova, Why You’re in Deep Trouble If
You Can’t Afford a Lawyer, MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.mother
jones.com/politics/2013/05/public-defenders-gideon-supreme-court-charts.
185 In Attorney K’s county, the bullpen is a large holding cell for multiple jail in-
mates waiting to be brought into court. The PSI was not submitted to the court until
three days before the sentencing. Meanwhile, Attorney K was in a three-day jury trial
in another court.
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say, “What am I supposed to do with that?” More routine are the
judges who give defense attorneys “five minutes to explain the pro-
ceedings to your client” or prosecutors who make a plea offer
“good for only a half an hour.”186
Trying to improve the quality of communication within such
an entrenched system of “McJustice”187 can seem like a fool’s er-
rand. Yet there are remedies that are not out of reach.
The first source of system improvement must be lawyers them-
selves. Four of the attorneys we spoke with thought that lawyers
bear some responsibility for the external conditions that prevent
adequate communication. Two of the attorneys used the word
“complicit” as they talked about how attorneys accede to time and
caseload pressures, knowing that communication has been substan-
dard, that clients lack adequate comprehension, and that they (the
lawyers) may have missed part of the client’s story. Another was
perhaps less circumspect, but equally aware: “Sometimes [exple-
tive] just has to proceed . . . I just proceed.” Attorney C posited that
attorneys have both an ethical and a constitutional obligation to
stop the conveyor belt—to inform supervisors and courts when
there are communication problems and to advocate for additional
time and resources. Attorney C’s position is supported, and in fact
mandated, by the Rules of Professional Conduct.188
Governmental agencies and funding sources have a corre-
sponding constitutional and ethical obligation to bring defender
caseloads within acceptable limits, as countless others have ar-
gued.189 But clients with language disabilities present an additional
layer that requires a more nuanced approach beyond pure num-
bers. Resources for speech-language experts would obviously be an
important start. We also recommend case weighting or “case
points” for a client with severe language disabilities. Case weighting
is a system that acknowledges that certain types of cases take more
time than others, and should be worth more points when calculat-
186 As a former public defender, co-author Michele LaVigne is well-acquainted with
these practices. Commonly, plea offers have expiration dates and times. See Missouri v.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012).
187 Bright & Sanneh, supra note 182.
188 See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 607–12
(Mo. 2012); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RS. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.7 (2011); Bright &
Sanneh, supra note 182.
189 Even USA Today has bemoaned the fact that “[a]n explosion in the number of
criminal cases has overwhelmed the indigent defense system, which represents about
80% of all accused.” Rick Hampson, You Have the Right to Counsel. Or Do You?, USA
TODAY (Mar. 12, 2013, 7:09 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2013/03/12/you-have-the-right-to-counsel-or-do-you/1983199/.
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ing an attorney’s workload.190 A client with serious language and
communicative deficiencies warrants that same attention. This type
of approach would create incentives for identifying and meeting
the myriad needs connected with language impairments.
Judges have their own obligation to improve the quality of
communication. Judges frequently make a determination of a cli-
ent’s comprehension on the attorney’s assurances that she has “ex-
plained” the process, the charges, and the consequences, and that
she has had enough time with her client. Those assurances are not
sufficient.191 The judge should make an independent inquiry to de-
termine whether the client in fact understands. As part of this in-
quiry, judges should engage in a dialogue with the defendant, even
if for only a short period. If done properly, these conversations can
reveal language and communication deficits that require further
exploration.192 And if more time is needed, it should not be
treated as a crisis. While “most trial judges are under considerable
calendar constraints,” the client’s constitutional rights are of “para-
mount importance.”193
The same can be said of prosecutors, whom Attorney J main-
tains have been “insulated” from the communication problems
that attorneys confront with clients. After Missouri v. Frye194 and Laf-
ler v. Cooper,195 a lawyer’s ability to communicate effectively with her
client is an issue that prosecutors can no longer ignore. A prosecu-
tor’s acquiescence to, or insistence on, “meet ‘em and plead ‘em”
deals flies in the face of a client’s right to effective assistance of
counsel. The lawyer who wisely says, “I need more time with my
client,” should not be risking enhanced penalties for her client.196
To place counsel in such an untenable position may be depriving
190 See, e.g., NORMAN LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW
IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 140–151 (2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/dam/aba/publications/books/ls_sclaid_def_securing_reasonable_caseloads.
authcheckdam.pdf.
191 State v. Brown, 716 N.W.2d 906, 921–22 (Wis. 2006); but cf. Bradshaw v. Stumpf,
545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005).
192 Judges, like lawyers, should also be trained about language impairments. Judges
should be encouraged to deviate from “the standard script of ‘yes-and-no’ type collo-
quies that permeate so many of our judicial tasks.” Strook v. Kedinger, 766 N.W.2d
219, 231–32 (Wis. 2009); see also LaVigne & Van Rybroek, supra note 5, at 116–17.
193 State of Wisconsin v. Bangert, 389 N.W.2d 12, 28 (Wis. 1986) (citing Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243–44 (1969)).
194 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (“Defense counsel has the duty to communicate
formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may
be favorable to the accused.”).
195 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383–84 (2012) (finding lawyer’s performance deficient when
he erroneously told defendant the state could not prove intent).
196 Prosecutors have wide latitude to condition plea offers on waivers of rights, ac-
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the client not only of his right to effective assistance of counsel, but
of his right to counsel period.197
VI. CONCLUSION
It is probably inevitable that the attorney-client relationship is
the aspect of the legal system hardest hit by the insidious effects of
language impairments. By its very nature, the defense function de-
pends on the ability of two human beings to interact at a deeply
intimate and complex level. Attorney F put it this way: “What is the
attorney-client relationship? It’s us trying to help [clients] through
a minefield and to help them find ways to make the best possible
choices . . . to help them manage an impossible situation.” Though
he did not use the words “communication” or “language,” Attorney
F was telling us in no uncertain terms that in the attorney-client
relationship, communication matters.
At first glance, the problems posed by language impairments
may seem insurmountable, especially for lawyers who are already
under tremendous caseload, resource, and time pressures. But ade-
quate communication is so essential to the effective operation of
the attorney-client relationship, and ultimately to the overall qual-
ity of justice, that we cannot ignore the prevalence of language im-
pairments among the people on attorney caseloads and court
dockets. We cannot let ourselves be satisfied with fractured com-
prehension of legal information, inability to work meaningfully
with counsel, uninformed decision-making, and “thin narratives.”
Addressing communication and language issues will never be a
complete fix for all impaired clients whose multitude of needs are
in direct conflict with an overloaded legal system; but for many it
can improve the connection between attorney and client, increase
the quality and quantity of information exchanged, and facilitate
better-informed analysis and decision-making. That would be a
good result all around.
cess to information, and acceptance by a certain date and time. See Bright & Sanneh,
supra note 182. See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363–64 (1978).
197 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659–60 (1984) (noting circumstances
when, “although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood
that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so
small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate”).

